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ABSTRACT 
 
 
What Happens When Cross-Sector Partnerships Are Mandated? Analyzing Trust through a 
Transaction Cost Approach 
 
 
Vanessa Hubbard Rastberger 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University. 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2020 
 
Chair: Niraj Verma, Ph.D. 
Professor of Public Policy and Urban Planning 
L. Douglas Wilder School of Government and Public Affairs 
 
 
 
Cross-sector partnerships that combine the perspectives and needs of public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors have been used to address public policy challenges. Research has shown that 
trust and reputation among partners play an important role in the performance of partnerships. 
Trust has been positively associated with the reduction of transaction costs of partnerships, and 
therefore, this study used a Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) approach as the theoretical 
framework.  
            Some partnerships are volitional while others are the results of legal or other mandates.  
Does this volitional or non-volitional (mandated) status affect how collaboration is perceived?  
For instance, will collaboration and trust be more likely to be positively perceived when partners 
are mandated or when they are volitional? And how does this perceived collaboration affect 
transaction costs and ultimately, the success of these partnerships? To answer these questions, 
this study used a non-experimental, quantitative research design. Its findings are consistent with 
the literature on the importance of trust and collaboration. The results confirmed that the 
perception of collaboration differs when partnerships have mandated partners and when the 
 ix
partnership has volitional or non-mandated partners.  Contrary to the literature, mandated 
partners had a slightly stronger perception of collaboration than non-mandated ones, something 
that was traced to the sectoral origins of the partners.  This underscored the importance of 
analyzing partnerships by sectors rather than just as an aggregate.   
Further disaggregation was obtained by dissecting collaboration into components.  All 
four components derived from the study: (1) “Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership 
Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy;” and (4) “Partnership Momentum” were 
perceived differently in cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners and, 
except for “Partnership Legitimacy,” non-mandated partners perceived collaboration more 
strongly.  
Overall, the results of the study confirmed some aspects of the literature, particularly the 
salience of trust in reducing transaction costs and furthering collaboration. At the same time, the 
results extend the literature by introducing two broad considerations: (a) sectoral origin or 
allegiance of participants and (b) whether they were mandated to participate.  As well, by 
dissecting collaboration into constituent parts, the study advances the literature by showing how 
the perception of capacity, responsiveness, legitimacy and momentum can affect collaboration in 
partnerships. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Study 
 
1.1 - Introduction 
 
In today’s economy, a well-educated and highly skilled workforce is the cornerstone of 
economic vitality and global competitiveness. Education and training are key components for a 
thriving economy and social wellbeing. A mismatch of education and training leads to a shortage 
of talent prepared to meet current and future workforce needs. Cross-sector partnerships that 
combine the perspectives and needs of public, private, and nonprofit sectors have been used to 
address the workforce skills gaps and the mismatch of talent supply and demand (Bryson, 
Crosby, & Stone, 2006).   While some partnerships are volitional, others are mandated and 
dictate what partners must participate. (Selsky & Parker, 2005).  The literature on these 
partnerships puts trust between participants representing the sectors as crucial to ensuring the 
success of the partnership (Nooteboom, 2007).  Yet, much less is known about the relationships 
between partners and particularly, the level of trust between them, when the partnerships are 
mandated as opposed to when they are volitional.   
The importance of trust increases as the problems become more complex, straddle 
sectors, and the knowledge to resolve them rapidly changes.  Workforce development, for 
instance, is replete with these challenges because rapidly changing technological knowledge 
implies equally rapid training, reformulation, and retraining along with the changing roles of 
those in different sectors.  Cybersecurity may have once come under the broad purview of 
“security” and hence the preserve of government.  There is little doubt that today, it is the shared 
responsibility of the public, private, and nonprofit sectors.  Similarly, in the manufacturing 
industry, the responsibility to replace an aging workforce by changing negative perceptions of 
manufacturing among younger generations and their parents is shared by all sectors. This 
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responsibility ranges from corporate social responsibility to mission-oriented nonprofits and 
public sector obligations to educate our workforce in order to maintain a vibrant and competitive 
economy.  
 Developing public policy in such situations is particularly tricky. It is widely known that 
the knowledge needed to solve these, and similar problems, extend across sectors.  But it is one 
thing to declare the importance of partnerships across sectors and quite another to make these 
partnerships sustainable.  In many cases, such partnerships have become part of the regulatory 
environment.  They are mandated and must happen.  However, mandated cooperation comes 
with its own difficulties and is susceptible to the charge of tokenism rather than genuine 
collaboration.  Trust between sectors and between those representing them has been noted as a 
particularly vulnerable area that could render these collaborations ineffective (Nooteboom, 
Berger, & Noorderhaven, 1997).  As a result, despite the significant amount of federal, state and 
local funding pouring into workforce cross-sector partnerships, lack of effective collaboration 
leads these partnerships to fail to achieve their desired outcomes (Rubin & Stankiewicz, 2001; 
Takahashi & Smutny, 2002).  
 
1.2 - Background 
Since the 1980s, public policymakers in the United States have advocated for 
collaboration through partnerships. Partnerships are promoted as a solution to efficiency and 
effectiveness among multiple organizations and sectors. For instance, Waddock (1988) describes 
partnerships as multiple organizations involving a commitment of resources, both time and 
effort, where organizations are solving problems that affect them all. These partnerships address 
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issues that extend beyond organizational and sector boundaries and transcend to more broad 
concerns of public policy (Waddock, 1998).  
Partnerships can be very complex in their implementation, often failing to return intended 
outcomes. Indeed, partnerships are sometimes called “fringe activities” because they are risky, 
can be difficult to negotiate, political, and challenged by the institutional status quo (Bruffee, 
1999). Partnerships are iterative and cyclical (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham, 2003), and are 
hard to explain (Brinkerhoff, 2002; Gazeley, 2008; Linder, 1999). Other challenges to the 
establishment and sustainability of cross-sector partnerships are the differing institutional 
formalities like policies and values (Verma, 2007). These policies and values can conflict with 
one another, thus, challenging the partnership at its core. Austin (2000) further adds that 
collaboration from within-sectors is different from collaboration between sectors as there is 
diversity of institutional cultures, performance measures, ways of communicating, motivations, 
decision-making styles, and personal skills. 
Specifically, the United States’ public workforce system is strategically driven by state 
and regional workforce partnerships in the form of a state board and regional boards that are 
cross-sectoral in nature and that consist primarily of private, public and community based 
nonprofit organizations. They are mandatory partnerships with some requirements for mandated 
partners to participate and are regulated under the federal legislation of the Workforce 
Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA) that was enacted in 2014. WIOA was designed to align 
the public workforce system with education and economic development and is led by regional 
leaders on a Workforce Development Board (WDB). (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity 
Act, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, 2014). WIOA seeks 
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to improve talent supply and demand by putting job seekers back to work and meeting the talent 
demands of businesses. 
WIOA reformed the public workforce system from the previous workforce legislation, 
the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (WIA), and put more expectations on the WDBs to be 
more strategic conveners of workforce system partners and stakeholders. Federal, state and local 
funding dollars are funneled to these regional workforce partnerships with the purpose of giving 
strategic direction for local workforce services.  
 
1.3 - Purpose of the Study 
Successful partnerships are those that are based on collaboration where partners exchange 
resources, talent and skills to develop innovative solutions (Mendel & Brundney, 2012). Yet, there 
has been little research about linkages between how the private, public and nonprofit sectors 
partner together. Studies on collaborative relationships between multiple sectors is limited and 
often occurs between same sectors, such as, nonprofit-public, public-private or nonprofit-private 
sectors only. What has been missing by scholars is the inclusive perspective of cross-sector 
partnerships and their often tri-party nature in the United States (Mendel & Brundney, 2012).  
The theoretical framework of this study is built around a Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) approach. The application of TCE theory to mandated and non-mandated partners in 
cross-sector partnerships has not been adequately explored. This study sought to evaluate how 
collaboration in cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners affect 
transaction costs. This is particularly important as cross-sector partnerships tend to create and 
enforce silos because of the inherent differences of partners. Partners’ perception of trust and 
collaboration is important because partnership success has been linked to partners’ perceived 
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belief that the benefits of collaboration will outweigh the costs (Lubell, Schneider, & Mete, 
2002).  
Research has shown that trust and reputation among partners play an important role in the 
performance of partnerships (Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2007; Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, & 
Soutter, 2000; Nooteboom, Berger, & Norrderhaven, 1997; Getha-Taylor, 2012; Dietz & Hartog, 
2006; Judge & Dooley, 2006; Nooteboom, 2007). Additionally, trust has been positively 
associated with reducing transaction costs (Gulati, 1998).  Higher levels of trust are associated 
with lower levels of governance costs (Gulati, 1998). Therefore, higher levels of trust reduce the 
transaction costs that occur between partners in partnerships, such as the costs of monitoring the 
partnership’s intended agreements. (Nooteboom, 1999). Nooteboom (1999) argues that a 
reduction of transaction costs will lead to increased partnership success.  
The purpose of this study is to determine the perception of collaboration and trust in 
cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners in order to better understand 
how collaboration affects transaction costs and ultimately, the success of these partnerships. 
 
1.4 - Theoretical Framework Overview  
          Part of the "New Institutional Economics” paradigm, TCE builds on traditional 
neoclassical economics by showing the importance and saliency of transaction costs (Judge & 
Dooley, 2006). For neoclassical economists, the costs of running an economic system are only 
for production and in a zero-transaction cost world (Coase, 1937). TCE theory was first 
developed by Ronald Coase (1937) and further matured and operationalized by Oliver 
Williamson in 1975 (Coase, 1992, Williamson, 1991).  
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TCE was a major revision of neoclassical economics and distinguishes itself by 
introducing the possibility of the influence of characteristics associated with the efficiency of a 
chosen form of organization, outside of the free market and by recognizing potential hidden costs 
(transaction costs) of future actions. Transaction costs are in contrast to production costs and are 
the costs of running the economic system, or the economic equivalent of friction in physics 
(Coase, 1937). Transactions must be exchanged, governed and organized, therefore, TCE 
encourages the formation of the most efficient governance structure to minimize transaction 
costs. (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). In TCE, the cost of transactions in one governance structure 
is compared with another.   
Coase’s explanation led to a paradigm shift in economics.  Coase argued that the mode of 
governance and level of organizational hierarchy chosen by an organization could be explained 
through an evaluation of the transaction costs the organization would face under different kinds 
of governance (Coase, 1937). Oliver Williamson (1975) extended Coase’s theory about the role 
of transaction costs in determining whether organizations prefer market-based or hierarchical 
forms of governance and formalized TCE as a foundational theory in organizational behavior 
and, especially, governance.  
TCE has become a powerful theory because it incorporates what was failed to be 
considered in neoclassical economics, the concepts of bounded rationality, uncertainty, asset 
specificity and opportunism behavior (Williamson, 1975). A principal message of TCE is that 
the existence of change within institutions can be explained through transaction-cost-
economizing behaviors (Williamson, 1985). Since transaction costs are not directly measured 
but, rather, estimated using dimensions of given transactions as proxies, TCE was used as a lens 
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in this study to determine how collaboration may affect transaction costs in cross-sector 
partnerships that include mandated and non-mandated partners.   
 
1.5 - Research Questions 
Because of the influence collaboration can have on transition costs and the success of 
cross-sector partnerships, there were two research questions guiding this study. They relate to the 
perception of collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners at aggregate and 
disaggregate levels.  
  
1.5.1 - Research Question 1 
At an aggregate level, are there differences in the perception of collaboration between mandated 
and non-mandated partners?   
 
1.5.2 - Research Question 2  
Are there differences in the perception of collaboration for disaggregated components of 
collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners? 
 
1.6 - Organization of the Study 
Chapter 1 described the challenges of cross-sector partnerships and introduces trust as a 
critical factor to the success of cross-sector partnerships. The theoretical framework of the study, 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE), was established as a powerful theory and as an approach to 
study what may be happening in cross-sector partnerships that have partners that are mandated 
and partners that are not mandated. In Chapter 2, the TCE literature validates the importance of 
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trust as a transaction cost and a factor of collaboration in successful partnerships. Chapter 3 
outlines the non-experimental quantitative research design that was used to collect data and 
establishes the methodological rationale of the study based on previous literature. Chapter 4 
presents the data collected from the study and an analysis of statistical results. Finally, Chapter 5 
provides a discussion of the study results and recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2 – Review of the Literature 
 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
 This chapter presents the literature related to this study. TCE theory, transaction costs and 
collaboration are further explored, along with the importance of trust in cross-sector partnerships. 
The chapter concludes by introducing factors determined to influence success in cross-sector 
partnership collaboration.  
 
2.2 - Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) Overview 
Neoclassical economics is based on the assumption that a price mechanism exists, and as 
a result, in a competitive market, there is supply and demand. The supplier and the buyer will 
reach an agreement without any negotiations because price is set by the free market. The 
exchange cost is only the cost of the item and therefore, a good will be produced by a firm only 
if it can be produced at a price lower than the market price. In neoclassical theory a firm is like a 
black-box that interacts with the market to seek knowledge for its functioning (Verma & 
Churchman, 1997; Verma, 1998); the organization of economic activities is taken as a given and 
firms are characterized as profit-maximizing producers (Williamson, 1985). The firm chooses a 
production function to maximize the firm’s performance (Henderson and Quant, 1980). The 
black-box of neoclassical economics assumes costless market transactions where there are zero 
transaction costs (Coase, 1937).  Hence, it does not include costs that could be motivated by self-
interest, opportunism and lower levels of trust. 
In contrast to neoclassical economics, Coase (1937) offers an economic explanation of 
transaction costs that helps to understand why partnerships and companies are formed going 
beyond just trading through contracts on a market. In contrast to production costs, transaction 
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costs are hidden costs that are not taken into account. Coase argues that there are a number of 
transaction costs to procuring something from the market that are in addition to just the price of 
the good (Coase, 1937).  
Neoclassical economics suggests a firm’s vertical boundary decisions are determined by 
technological factors (i.e.: economies of scale or scope) while TCE distinguishes itself from 
neoclassical economics by being influenced by characteristics associated with the efficiency of 
the chosen form of organization (Williamson, 1985). In other words, TCE explains what 
neoclassical economics failed to consider: bounded rationality, uncertainty, asset specificity and 
opportunism behavior (Williamson, 1985). Therefore, one can come to the conclusion that some 
forms of governance are more suitable than others for a given transaction. Within TCE, all 
economic activity revolves around a transaction that is exchanging a good or service between 
two or more economic actors (Macher & Richman, 2008). Williamson (1985) argued that in 
order to optimize that exchange, an appropriate governance mechanism must be matched to the 
nature of the transaction. 
Coase (1960) argues that as transaction costs continue to rise, firms may be less likely to 
internalize externalities on their own. He suggests that direct government regulation may be a 
solution in lieu of a legal system that could determine allowable market transactions (Coase, 
1960). Coase (1960, p. 17) notes that “the government may impose regulations which state what 
people must do or must not do and which have to be obeyed.” Coase (1960) suggests that the 
government act as a ‘super firm’ which could provide a solution at a lower cost than could a 
private firm, by avoiding the market altogether. Higher and higher levels of centralization may 
need to deal with social costs (Coase, 1960). His work suggests that solutions may first be found 
in the market, then the firm, then the state and even further to a level of aggregation on a country 
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or global wide scale. This work is important when viewing social problems, such as workforce 
supply and demand, and potential solutions in the form of mandated cross-sector partnerships. In 
addition, Williamson (1991) subsequently addressed the potential for hybrid forms of 
governance that share some characteristics of both markets and hierarchies, and although he 
acknowledged that conventional TCE (and his work on the subject) focuses only on dyadic 
interorganizational relationships, he noted that the core principles in TCE can be applied to the 
analysis of network relationships. As such, TCE can be a lens to view direct government 
regulation (mandated partnerships with mandated partners). This study used this economic lens 
to determine how collaboration may influence transaction costs and therefore, the success of 
partnerships.  
 
 2.2.1 - Transaction Cost Definitions 
Many different definitions of transaction costs appear in the literature. Coase (1937) 
defines the term transaction costs as costs using price mechanisms associated with specifying, 
negotiating, and enforcing contracts. He argued that if transactions taking place in the market 
were too costly, transactions would be taken within the boundaries of the firm (Coase, 1937). 
Arrow (1969) defines transaction costs as the costs of running the economic system. In the mid-
1970s, Williamson emphasized transactions in the analysis of governance structures, referring to 
this approach as “transaction cost approach.” (Williamson, 1975). In 1985, Williamson defined 
transaction costs to include the costs of drafting, negotiating, and enforcing an agreement, along 
with the costs of governance and bonding to secure commitments (Williamson, 1985). Unlike 
previous approaches where transaction costs have a fixed value, Williamson’s approach provides 
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the notion that transaction costs have relative values and can be different from one organization 
to another (Williamson, 1985).  
Wallis and North (1986) define transaction costs as the costs of processing and conveying 
information, coordinating, purchasing, marketing, advertising, selling, handling legal matters, 
shipping, and managing and supervising. Davis (1986) defines transaction costs as the costs of 
obtaining information, monitoring behavior, compensating intermediaries, and enforcing 
contracts. Additionally, North (1990) explains transaction costs as the costs of measuring the 
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights and policing and 
enforcing agreements.  
 
2.2.2 - Composition of Transaction Costs 
According to Williamson (1985), there are two kinds of transaction costs: (1) the ex ante 
costs of drafting, negotiating, and safeguarding an agreement, such as search and contract costs 
and (2) the ex post costs of haggling, governance, and bonding to secure commitments. In the 
case of partnerships, ex ante costs arise at the beginning and ex post costs occur during the 
partnership’s lifespan (Williamson, 1985). Table 1 outlines the most common sources and types 
of transaction costs. 
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Table 1 
 Sources and Types of Transaction Costs 
  
Asset Specificity 
 
Environmental Uncertainty 
 
Behavioral Uncertainty 
 
A: Source of Transaction Costs 
Nature of Governance Problem Safeguarding Adaptation Performance Evaluation 
B. Type of Transaction Costs 
Direct Costs 
 
Costs of crafting 
safeguards 
 
Communication, negotiation, 
and coordination costs 
 
Screening and selection 
costs (ex ante); 
Measurement costs (ex 
post) 
Opportunity Costs Failure to invest in 
productive assets 
Maladaptation; Failure to 
adapt 
Failure to identify 
appropriate partners (ex 
ante); Productivity losses 
through effort adjustments 
(ex post) 
 
Note: Rindfeisch & Heide (1997) summarize the source and nature of the most common forms of 
transaction costs.  
 
The two assumptions that affect the critical dimensions of a given transaction are: (1) 
individuals may behave opportunistically; and (2) individuals are characterized by bounded 
rationality (Williamson, 1985).  Individuals often act out of their self-interest and towards their 
best opportunity, seeking to sometimes exploit a situation to their own advantage (Williamson, 
1979). This does not always happen but, the risk of opportunism is always present.  
Opportunism in TCE goes beyond conventional economic theories of organizational 
behavior (Cyert & March, 1992; March & Simon, 1993; Simon, 1979) and collective action  
(Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 1990; Taylor, 1990) that presume organizations will act in their own self- 
interest by assuming some organizations will seek to take advantage of others with whom they 
transact. This potential behavior makes opportunism a key source of distrust among 
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organizations (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Das & Rahman, 2002; Hosmer, 1995; Vlaar, Van 
de Bosch, & Volberda, 2007;). Researchers studying trust in relation to TCE suggest that in the 
absence of opportunism there is little or no need for trust (Bradach & Eccles, 1989, Das & Teng, 
2001, Hill, 1990). TCE does not depend on trust but acknowledges the potential for trust to lower 
transaction costs and the importance of the appropriate selection of governance (Dyer & Chu, 
2003; Hill, 1990; Noorderhaven, 1996).  
Additionally, due to a lack of knowledge and information-processing capabilities, 
individuals are not always able to act rationally, even if they initially intend to do so. Because of 
bounded rationality, it is impossible to predict partner’s potential future actions. Since partners 
may have to closely monitor each other’s performance and create a way to enforce their 
agreement, transaction costs are likely to increase (Gantz, 2012).  
The critical dimensions of transactions are: (1) asset specificity; and (2) uncertainty 
(Williamson, 1985). With regard to asset specificity, a valuable asset may be attached to a 
particular transaction. Asset specificity can be explained by the extent an investment is made to 
support a particular transaction that has a higher value to that transaction than compared to if it 
was redeployed for another purpose (Williamson, 1975). Williamson (1975, 1985) argues that 
transaction-specific assets are not redeployable and are too specialized, such as human 
investments in knowledge. 
When partners have to invest a portion of partnership resources (financial and non-
financial, such as time) in purposes other than those associated with productive activities 
(outputs), the partnership’s performance drops (Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Therefore, the 
specificity of assets for specific transactions could increase coordination activities between 
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partners, as well as their intensity, and thus increases transaction costs (Artz & Brush, 2000; 
Erickson, 2001; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995).  
Uncertainty intensifies problems that arise because of bounded rationality and 
opportunism (Erickson, 2001). Because of uncertainty, transaction costs can increase. For 
example, partners may seek to reduce uncertainty by negotiating complex contracts which in turn 
can increase ex ante transaction costs and later, if renegotiation is needed, possibly increase ex 
post transaction costs (Jobin, 2008). This uncertainty is exacerbated when you have cross-sector 
partnerships that involve partners that are not similar to each other due to the nature of sector 
differences, thus, leading to a more conflicting environment. 
 
2.3 - Importance of Collaboration  
Cross-sector partnerships can decline or underperform, be terminated or inappropriately 
persist (Inkpen & Ross, 2001), face collaborative inertia (Huxham,1996), or persist latently 
(Cestero,1999). Partnerships can have many challenges such as, a lack of clarity in defining 
common goals, complexity of accountability structures, resource capacity, performance 
measurement, and leadership and trust concerns (Gray & Jenkins, 2003; NAO, 2001; OAGC, 
1999; OECD, 2001; Stern, 2004). Additionally, cross-sector partnership challenges can be 
lumped into themes such as mistrust, differing institutional cultures and practices, and 
insufficient partnership resources. Many partnerships, particularly regional partnerships are 
riddled with challenges to collaboration, such as competition fueled by scare and sometimes 
declining public funding. 
Collaboration is defined in a number of ways in the literature. Mattessich, Murray-Close, 
& Monsey (2001) state that scholars do use different terms interchangeably to refer to 
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collaboration, such as cooperation and coordination. Other words found in the literature that 
express collaboration are roundtable, partnership, relationship, alliance, consortia, network, and 
coalition (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005; Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Winer & Ray, 1994). 
Bruder (1997) describes collaboration as specific actions taken that could not be done by a single 
organization. The working definition of collaboration used in this study is “Collaboration is a 
mutually beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organizations to 
achieve common goals,” (Mattessich & Johnson, 2001, p.4, 2018, p. 5). 
The literature reiterates that cross-sector partnerships are formed in response to issues that 
no individual partner or sector can address effectively on its own (Seigel, 2010; Bryson et al, 2006). 
Cross-sector collaboration involves “the linking or sharing of information, resources, activities, 
and capabilities by organizations in two or more sectors to achieve jointly an outcome that could 
not be achieved by organizations in one sector separately” (Bryson et al, 2006, p. 49). Researchers 
content that the most efficient collaboration is evident when organizations collaborate using 
methods that synthesize the different perspectives of each partner in understanding complex 
problems (Frey, Lohmeier, Lee, & Tollefson, 2006; Gajda, 2004; Gajda & Koliba, 2007; Thomson 
& Perry, 2006). 
The relationships between sectors in cross-sector partnerships can take different forms 
and change over time (Austin, 2000). Googins and Rochlin (2000) discuss the many forms that 
partnerships can take, with most relationships being just a one-way transfer of resources. 
Googins and Rochlin (2000) further state that this relationship does not seem to satisfy the 
intuitive conditions of a “true partnership” between sectors. Thomson and Perry (2006) 
summarize the process of collaboration as consisting of five dimensions: governance, 
administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity.  
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2.3.1 - Collaboration Motivation 
The primary motivation for partnerships is normally assumed to be strategic 
interdependence in which one organization needs resources and/or capabilities that it does not 
possess. There must be motivation for partners in cross-sector partnerships to devote resources and 
time to build and sustain a partnership. If partnerships are to be sustainable, there must be intrinsic 
value for all partners (Austin, 2000; Googins & Rochlin, 2000) and therefore, it is important to 
examine the motives and drivers of partners (Cappelli, Shapiro, & Shumanis, 1998; Johnson, 2012; 
Longoria, 1999).  
Motivations in partnerships will reflect partner divergent institutional goals and purpose 
(Bennett & Thompson, 2011). However, there are core pieces of commonality across the sectors. 
Motivations of collaboration may be that partners have an interest in greater financial capacity 
(Bennett & Thompson, 2011; Guthrie et al, 2008; Hoff, 2002; Smith & Wholstetter, 2006) or by 
legislative mandates that provide funding to partnering organizations (Cappelli et al., 1998; 
Longoria, 1999; Johnson, 2012). Other motivation could be through building community capacity 
and public perception (Bartlett, Frederick, Gulbrandsen & Murillo, 2002; Bennett & Thompson, 
2011; Edens & Gilsinan, 2005; Hands, 2005; Hoff, 2002; Longoria, 1999; Seitanidi, Koufopoulos, 
& Palmer, 2010). Different from alliances between same sector organizations, partners in cross-
sector partnerships have different goals and are motivated differently; these motivations, as a 
result, can lead to power imbalances (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011).  
The literature suggests that it is important to study the divergences and convergences of 
the collaboration level among various sector partners. In particular, the literature points to the 
role of divergent partner motivations and how this may affect partner engagement (Bartlett et al., 
2002; Bennett & Thompson, 2011; Edens & Gilsinan, 2005; Hands, 2009; Hoff, 2002; Longoria, 
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1999; Seitanidi et al., 2010). As previously discussed, transaction costs can rise when a partner 
from one sector forms a partnership with another sector that does not have goal congruence. 
Graddy & Ferris (2007) refer to the public and nonprofit sectors as both sharing a commitment to 
service provision and the lack of profit motivation. This indicates that the public sector would 
only be expected to partner with private sector partners when they provide a unique benefit that 
will maintain or lower transaction costs (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). These findings in the literature 
drove the decision to study the collaboration among partnerships that included different sectors, 
and additionally, how motivations may be present or absent in partnerships with mandated and 
non-mandated partners.   
 
2.4 - Importance of Trust  
Trust is a primary concept in the cross-sector collaboration and interorganizational 
literature (Bierly & Gallagher, 2007; Zand, 1972; Wood & Gray, 1991; Mattessieh et al., 2001) 
and in effective collaboration and partnering. (Getha-Taylor, 2012). Partnership has been defined 
as “at least two agencies with common interests working together, in a relationship characterized 
by some degree of trust, equality and reciprocity” (Rees, Mullins, & Bovaird, 2012, p. 14). This 
relationship is assumed to contrast with market-based, contractual relationships which are 
assumed to be low trust and adversarial in nature, although there are exceptions (Rees et al., 
2012). 
Trust within a group, such as a partnership, is not just the aggregate of the relationships 
with other group members, which is what is typically researched, but the attitude that the 
individual holds toward the group as a collective (Korsgaard, Brodt, & Sapienza, 2003). There is 
limited empirical research on how trust is perceived in groups or collectives, which according to 
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Korsgaard et al., (2003), provides a strong argument for the validity of viewing trust in the 
collective. Trust has emerged as the attitude most critical for cooperation within groups and 
organizations and a powerful motivator of cooperation (Smith, 1995).  
Trust is a central element of modern theories of organizational management and 
sociology (Arrow, 1974; Coleman, 1990; Gambetta,1988; Hardin, 2001; Kramer & Cook, 2004; 
March, 1994). Whether or not trust exists is a key consideration when assessing the nature of 
relationships between two or more parties as individuals, groups, or organizations (Alter & Hage, 
1992; Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008; McEvily & Zaheer, 2004; Provan & Sydow, 2008; Ring & 
Van de Ven, 1994). Various forms of trust are considered attributes or contributing factors in 
sociological theories intended to explain interorganizational dynamics and individual and 
organizational behavior (Kramer, 2006). As organizations operate in increasingly interconnected 
environments, their ability to negotiate and manage trust in both internally and externally facing 
contexts is viewed as an essential ingredient to their success (Kramer, 2006; Kramer & Tyler, 
1996; Lane & Bachmann, 1998; Saunders, Skinner, & Lewicki, 2010).  
Research has shown that trust among partners play a critical role in partnership 
performance (Gulati, 1998; NAO, 2001: 9; OAGC, 1999: 5–11; OECD, 2001: 44; Stern, 2004; 
Zaheer and Venkatraman, 1995; Zaheer, McEvily, & Perone, 1998). Trust has been positively 
associated with performance within strategic alliances (Luo, 2002; Zaheer et al., 1998). Bardach 
(1998) identifies trust as a key element in one of two dimensions of interagency collaborative 
capacity. The findings of Huxham and Vangen's (2005) extensive research on collaboration led 
to the conclusion that trust is a critical component of collaboration.  In her study of 422 
collaborations, Thomson (2001) found evidence to support Huxham and Vangen's conclusions.  
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Table 2 
 Additional Literature on the Concept of Trust 
 
Literature 
 
Reference 
 
Trust is essential for cooperation. Child, Faulkner, & Tallman 
(2005); Faulkner & De Rond 
(2000); Lane (1998); Loveridge 
(2000) 
 
Successful alliances exhibit trust between the partners; 
unsuccessful alliances exhibit a lack of trust. 
 
Konza & Lewin (1998) 
 
 
Trust is positively related to alliance performance. 
 
Krishnan et. al. (2006) 
 
High levels of trust are a good predictor of alliance 
success. 
 
Schumacher (2006) 
 
 
2.4.1 - Trust and Transaction Costs in Partnerships 
Trust does not feature prominently in some economic theories, but where theory does  
accommodate trust, it is most commonly considered for its impact on economic efficiency in   
theories, such as, transaction cost economic or resource-based perspectives (Leiblein, 2003;  
Madhok & Tallman, 1998). Trust was identified, long ago, as perhaps the most efficient 
mechanism for governing a transaction and critical to transactional relationships (Arrow, 1974). 
Studies in the literature have established that trust can reduce transaction costs (Dyer, 1997; Dyer 
& Chu, 2003; Zaheer, et al., 1998) and facilitate the exchange of resources and information 
(Uzzi, 1997). Williamson’s view of trust as too narrow to reflect real-world organizations is 
shared by several theorists going beyond Williamson to acknowledge the potential value of trust 
in reducing transaction costs (Bromiley & Cummings, 1995; Gulati, 1995; Noorderhaven, 1996; 
Pitelis, 1993; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995). Grady & Ferris (2007) discusses the complexity of 
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the issue of interdependence versus trust, a key factor in many alliances. Partners may realize 
voids in assets which leads to the recognition of further dissimilarities that may raise transaction 
costs and dispel any pre-existing trust that may have been previously present.  
Trust is a central component of interorganizational collaboration because it reduces 
opportunism and transaction costs more quickly than other organizing mechanisms (Bierly & 
Gallagher, 2007; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; Ostrom, 1998; Smith et al., 1995). Nooteboom et 
al., (1997) maintain that trust due to social norms or personal relations is underrepresented in 
TCE and that trust often substitutes for formal contracts and controls. Yet, TCE finds trust alone 
insufficient to safeguard against opportunism, and relies on explicit controls such as contracts, 
monitoring, and enforcement (Lane, 1998; Williamson, 1985).  
Furthermore, controls such as monitoring can have unintended consequences, as partners 
being monitored may perceive additional monitoring as an indication of distrust directed at them 
(Ferrin, Bligh, & Kohles, 2007; Guerra, 2002; Kramer, 1999), reducing the level of trust in the 
entity performing the monitoring. Some sociological theory suggests that trust itself serves as a 
control against opportunistic behavior, especially when reputations are intended to be preserved 
(Lane, 1998; Zucker, 1986). However, trust alone cannot eliminate the threat of opportunism 
entirely, as it always exists, even in long-term relationships that have a history of trustworthy 
behavior (Dasgupta, 1988, Hardin, 1991).  
Where trust manifests in the use of informal contracts and self-enforcement rather than 
formal agreements and legal sanctions (Ring, 2008), partnerships can realize cost efficiencies 
compared to formal legal agreements (Deakin, Lane, & Wilkinson, 1994; Lyons & Mehta, 1997). 
As trust declines, partners are more likely to spend more resources monitoring each other’s 
contributions than time on producing additional outcomes (Nooteboom et al., 1997). When this 
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happens, partnership productivity can decline (Nooteboom et al., 1997).  The higher the levels of 
trust among partners, less resources are necessary with regards of monitoring and enforcement 
costs, hence the higher the partnership performance (Dyer, 1997). Developing and maintaining 
trust requires organizations to devote time, effort, and investment of resources (asset specificity) 
all of which involve costs depending on the context and the parties involved. Yet, trust improves 
economic efficiency in many types of collaboration, primarily in terms of lowering transaction 
costs and the costs of coordinating and governing partnerships.  
Research has shown that there is uncertainty surrounding strategic alliances and 
partnerships (Mjoen & Tallman, 1997; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992; Zaheer et al.,1998). Several 
studies have identified trust between partners as a key factor that may help minimize 
uncertainties and reduce the threat of opportunism in strategic alliances (Das & Teng, 1998; 
Gulati, 1998; Gulati & Garguilo, 1999; Koza & Lewin, 1998; Smith & Barclay, 1997; Wuyts & 
Geyskens, 2005). When trust is present, the partnership will be able to weather uncertainties 
better than when trust is not present (Parkhe, 1993; Zaheer & Venkatraman, 1995; Larson, 1992; 
Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Hill, 1990). The primary benefit resulting from trust in 
interorganizational relationships is the reduction in costs that would be incurred in the absence of 
trust (Hill, 1990).   
 
2.4.2 - Trust and Volitional Partnership 
Potential partners must assess the trade-offs in establishing a partnership, such as the 
benefits of cooperation and the risks of vulnerability to opportunism (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). 
Partners will normally seek to mitigate this risk by selecting partners that offer the least threat 
(Graddy & Ferris, 2007). This prompts partners to align with partners with whom they have the 
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greatest strategic interdependence (Verma, 2007; Graddy & Ferris, 2007). As gains are weighed 
against risks, organizations will seek partners it trusts (Graddy & Ferris, 2007).  
Graddy & Ferris (2007) suggest that organizations will prefer partners with who they 
have ties and social network connections. Gulati (1995) discovered that organizations having 
previous ties were more likely to form alliances, particularly as environmental uncertainty 
increases. Graddy & Ferris (2007) conclude that prior partner interaction is an important pre-
condition to forming an effective alliance.  
A defining dimension of collaboration is that partners must share a dual identity, and they 
must maintain their own distinct identities and organizational authority separate from (though 
simultaneously with) the collaborative identity (Thomson, 2001). The literature points to this 
reality that causes tension between self-interest created by individual organizational missions and 
an identity that is also for the collective interest of the partnership (Bardach, 1998; Tschirhart, 
Christensen, and Perry ,2005; Van de Ven, Emmett, and Koenig 1975; Wood & Gray, 1991). 
Huxham (1996, p. 15) refers to this tension as the autonomy-accountability dilemma and 
concludes that because "collaboration is voluntary, partners generally need to justify their 
involvement in it in terms of its contribution to their own aims" or they will seek to not 
collaborate at all.  
In reality, partner makeup is not always based on voluntarism and could even be from 
reluctant membership (Kirchhoff & Ljunggren, 2016). Some partnerships may be mandated to 
exist and have mandated partner requirements as is the case for WDBs authorized under WIOA. 
When partnerships are not voluntary and are imposed through legislation, partnerships can have 
equality issues (Kirchhoff & Ljunggren, 2016) and uneven trust balances, allowing trust to serve 
more informally as a commodity.   
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Mandatory partnership membership could be institutional, instituted from a legislative 
mandate, but to further complicate, it could also be individual and more personal. For example, 
this may happen when an organization serving as a partner designates an employee, perhaps 
unwillingly, to serve on its behalf.  Therefore, whether or not someone is mandated or required 
to be in a partnership can be somewhat subjective. Rees et al., (2012, p. 52) concludes that 'while 
there is theoretically no necessary conflict between competition and collaboration, in practice, 
partnerships have tended to work more effectively when they are underpinned by voluntary trust-
based relationships rather than by imposed or mandated partnership forms or by competitive 
arrangements that undermine trust.'  
Furthermore, Game theory indicates that cooperative behavior is more likely when there 
is a longer-term expectation of cooperation (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). Partnerships that promote 
long-term or include mandatory partners determined by legislation to remain indefinitely in the 
partnership, may be more likely to succeed. (Graddy & Ferris, 2007). Sullivan & Skelcher (2002) 
p. 83) make the case that short-term contracts versus longer term relational partnerships for 
delivery of public services was motivated by the expectation that “trust and mutuality will 
replace the suspicion and divergence of interests found in traditional short-term contracting.”   
Yet, the use of mandated partnerships has increasingly displaced trust-based partnerships 
through the introduction of external conditions and controls, with legislative and regulatory 
mechanisms to encourage partnerships (Hudson, 1999). Armistead & Pettigrew (2008, p.22) 
argue that specific cases of mandated partnerships can cause “a tendency to try to make the 
partnership work by following a set of prescriptions or check lists which might satisfy 
government, but which fail to address the dynamics of partnership performance and the causes of 
partnership failure.” Dowling & Glendinning (2004) conceptualize the success of partnerships by 
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how well partners work together and the long-term sustainability of the partnership. It is critical 
that the value of trust and other potential components of collaboration that could contribute to 
more successful conditions for mandated partnerships be better understood. A further 
examination of non-voluntarism in partnerships may reveal different perspectives on trust and 
important collaboration components, both within and across sectors.  
 
2.5 - Cross-Sector Collaboration Success 
In 2015, Krathu, Pichler, Xiao, Werthner, Neidhardt, Zapletal, and Huemer conducted a 
qualitative study on interorganizational success factors and after reviewing 177 publications, 
found that trust was a factor that played a significant role in collaboration success. Mattessich & 
Johnson (2018) presented 22 factors that influence the success of collaborations after a review of 
74 relevant studies. They provided a comprehensive review of empirical collaboration literature 
by conducting a meta-analysis of factors for successful collaboration. One of the 22 factors is 
mutual respect, understanding and trust. Forty-one of the 74 studies were identified as 
contributing to the factor of mutual respect, understanding, and trust. The survey used in this 
study measured the 22 factors that Mattessich & Johnson (2018) determined would influence the 
success of collaborations. 
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Table 3 
Collaboration Success Factors 
 
Category 
 
Collaboration Success Factors 
 
Environment  History of collaboration or cooperation in the 
community  
 Collaborative group seen as a legitimate leader in the 
community  
 Favorable political and social climate  
Membership Characteristics  Mutual respect, understanding, and trust 
 Appropriate cross section of members 
 Members see collaboration as being in their self-
interest 
 Ability to compromise 
Process and Structure  Members share a stake in both process and outcome 
 Multiple layers of participation 
 Flexibility 
 Development of clear roles and policy guidelines 
 Adaptability to changing conditions 
 Appropriate pace of development 
 Evaluation and continuous learning 
Communication  Open and frequent communication 
 Established informal relationships and communication 
links 
Purpose  Concrete, attainable goals and objectives 
 Shared vision 
 Unique purpose 
Resources  Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time 
 Skilled leadership 
 Engaged stakeholders 
Note: Mattesich et al., (2018) Collaboration Success Factors 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
 
3.1 - Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the research design used in this study. This study 
sought to determine if partners’ perception of collaboration was different. A conceptual diagram 
of the primary variables that guided this study is presented. Additionally, chapter 3 includes the 
study population, data collection procedures, and study limitations.  
 
3.2 - Research Design 
For this study, a non-experimental quantitative methodology was used. Quantitative data 
collected on perceptions are recognized as correlational and descriptive research that allow an 
area of interest to be described (Isaac & Michael, 1997). Plonsky and Gass (2011) noted that 
quantitative research designs are appropriate when the research aims to examine perceptions and 
observations. After a review of a study that conducted a mixed-method approach using the same 
survey instrument, it was determined that a quantitative approach only would be the best fit for 
this study. Adding open-ended questions to the already 40+ item survey resulted in incomplete 
surveys and survey fatigue (Culver-Dockings, 2012). 
This study is cross-sectional, and therefore, data was collected at one point in time 
(Creswell, 2009). Survey design was chosen to be the most appropriate for this study and served 
as a preferred method of data collection because it had quick turnaround time and was of low 
cost to implement (Creswell, 2009). “The survey method is one of the most important data 
collection methods in the social sciences, and as such, it is used extensively to collect 
information on numerous subjects of research” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 2000, p. 225). 
Additionally, the survey method as a questionnaire eliminated the interviewer bias that could be 
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evident in a qualitative study because there was no personal contact and created an atmosphere 
for anonymity. 
 
3.2.1 - Independent Variables 
The independent variables in this study are the 22 factors included in the survey 
instrument, the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory (Mattessich & Johnson, 2018).  These 
factors are evidence-based factors that increase the likelihood that collaboration will succeed 
(Mattessich & Johnson, 2018).  These factors are the study variables and include: (1) History of 
collaboration or cooperation in the community; (2) Collaborative group seen as a legitimate 
leader in the community; (3) Favorable political and social climate; (4) Mutual respect, 
understanding, and trust; (5) Appropriate cross section of members; (6) Members see 
collaboration as being in their self-interest; (7) Ability to compromise; (8) Members share a stake 
in both process and outcome; (9) Multiple layers of participation; (10) Flexibility; (11) 
Development of clear roles and policy guidelines; (12) Adaptability to changing conditions; (13) 
Appropriate pace of development; (14) Evaluation and continuous learning; (15) Open and 
frequent communication; (16) Established informal relationships and communication links; (17) 
Concrete, attainable goals and objectives; (18) Shared vision; (19) Unique purpose; (20) 
Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time; (21) Skilled leadership; and (22) Engaged 
stakeholders.  Additional information on the survey instrument is included in the Instrumentation 
section of this chapter. 
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3.2.2 - Dependent Variable 
The responses to the questions on the survey were used to create the dependent variable, 
the “Perception of Collaboration.” Because there is no direct measure of the “Perception of 
Collaboration,” the survey responses (22 variables) were used to derive factor scores as proxies 
for the dependent variable.  
 
3.2.3 - Demographic Variables 
The demographic variables included partnership/board identity, the type of sector the 
partner belonged to (private, public, or nonprofit), whether a partner was required to be on the 
workforce board or not (mandated/non-mandated) and the length of time served on the board 
(partnership). The private sector is operationalized as all for-profit businesses that are not owned 
or operated by the government. The public sector is operationalized as the part of an economy 
that is controlled by the government. The nonprofit sector is operationalized as a group of 
organizations formed for purposes other than generating profit and in which no part of 
the organization's income is distributed to its members, directors, or officers.  
The Section 107 of the WIOA law mandates which partners shall or may maintain 
membership on WDBs (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014). WDB members 
are appointed by local elected officials from nominations submitted from the local organizations 
and businesses (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014). A business member 
majority is required and must meet 51% of the board composition. Additionally, the Virginia 
Board of Workforce Development published Policy 200-02: Establishment and Membership of 
Local Workforce Development Boards (VBWD Policy 200-02, 2016) outlining additional 
guidance for the membership of the WDBs and describes in detail which members are mandatory 
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and which members are optional (Appendix A). The WDB must contain 51% representation of 
the private sector, however, there is no mandatory requirement for which private sector 
companies must participate on WDBs.  
 
Table 4 
 Demographic Characteristics as Variables 
 
Variable 
 
Description 
 
 
Sector Identity 
 
Private, Public or Nonprofit 
 
Board Identity Name of Virginia WDB serving on 
Partner Membership Required to be on the board (Mandated/Non-mandated) 
Length of Time Serving on the Board 0-12 months; 13-24 months; 25-48 months; 49+ months 
 
 
3.2.4 - Conceptual Diagram 
 A conceptual diagram is used to describe the concepts of a study and their relationships 
in an abstract way.  The following diagram shows a visual depiction of the primary concepts in 
this study.  
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Diagram 
 
3.2.5 - Population 
The defined study population was the Governor-certified functioning workforce board 
members from all 15 WDBs across Virginia, as mandated to exist by the WIOA. The identity of 
the WDB members is public information and the entire population was surveyed. Under WIOA, 
board membership cannot be manipulated based on federal and state regulations for local board 
composition and board member appointments (Johnson, 2017). As of August 2019, a census of 
the 15 WDBs in Virginia was conducted and 459 board members were discovered to be publicly 
listed on the WDB websites. Inclusion criteria are the requirements an individual must have to be 
eligible to participate in a survey (Fink, 2003). Criteria to become a WDB member aligns with 
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local board member requirements as defined by WIOA and Virginia state policy. The following 
organizations are mandated partners required from both the WIOA and VWDB policy: (1) Labor 
Organization; (2) Joint Labor Management Apprenticeship Program; (3) Apprenticeship 
Program; (4) Institution of Higher Education providing workforce investment activities; (5) 
Economic and Community Development; (6) State Employment Office; (7) Title 1 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973; (8) Adult Education Program administering WIOA Title II Adult 
Education and Family Literacy (AEFLA) activities; and (9) Career and Technical Education 
Program (Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, 2014 &VBWD Policy 200-02, 2016). The 
population selected ensured representation of the operationalized sectors because of the 
mandatory requirement of certain public and nonprofit sector participation and the requirement 
that 51% of board members must be from the private sector. Regional workforce development 
collaborations, such as the WDBs have emerged as noteworthy approaches to tackle complex 
problems within a region’s workforce development system (Melendez, Borges-Mendez, Visser 
& Rosofsky, 2015). 
A non-probability purposive sampling method was chosen for this study because of the 
additional requirements for board membership mandated by the Virginia policy through the 
Virginia Workforce Development Board, in addition to the WIOA federal law. Because states 
are given the flexibility to expand the requirements for mandatory membership of the WDBs, it 
would have been difficult to obtain comparable samples across states.  
 
3.2.6 - Instrumentation 
The instrument used in this study was the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory 
(Appendix B). The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory contains questions related to 22 
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factors (variables) that influence the success of collaboration as identified in the literature by the 
authors using meta-analysis (Mattessich & Johnson, 2018). An extensive review of the literature 
led to the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory developed by Mattessich and Monsey (1992). 
Using meta-analysis, Mattessich and Monsey (1992) used 133 collaboration studies from 1975-
1991 to determine 19 factors that impact successful collaboration among organizations. A second 
and third edition of the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory has been released with updated 
literature, and as a result, the survey tool was enhanced to now consist of 22 factors that 
influence the success of collaboration.  
The survey consisted of 44 items scored on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The survey respondent was asked to indicate what board they are 
serving on and if they are part of the private, public or nonprofit sector. Additional demographic 
questions included how long they had been serving on the board and if they were required to be 
on the board. This latter phrase “required to be on the board” had room for ambiguity because 
someone may be a volunteer although her/his employer may be an organization that is mandated 
to participate.  This was obviated by allowing survey respondents to self-report whether or not 
they were required to be on the board, without regard to whether this requirement was solely 
institutional or individual. The survey was designed to take approximately 15-25 minutes to 
complete.  
The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory was developed as a tool for partnerships to 
access the strengths and weaknesses of collaboration. Over time, it has been used in multiple 
research studies (Townsend & Shelley, 2008), indirectly buttressing its validity and usefulness.  
Townsend & Shelley (2008) contend that the established psychometric properties of the Wilder 
instrument permit researchers to employ more powerful statistical test procedures.  
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Reliability tests for the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory were first conducted by 
Derose, Beatty, & Jackson (2004) and later by Townsend and Shelley (2008). Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients were used to determine the consistency of survey questions (Tavakol & Dennick, 
2011). These studies found similar results with Cronbach alphas for 14 of the 20 factors between 
.66 and .86 (Derose et al., 2004). Three factors had lower reliability but were still considered to 
have indications of important relationships between the items within the factors. Townsend & 
Shelley (2008) found there was a statistically significant theoretical structure of the instrument 
that grouped the 40 collaborative items into four meaningful components.  The four components 
of the factor analysis explained 55.5% of the total variance (Townsend & Shelley, 2008). Both 
Vogt (2000) and Derose et al., (2004) determined the instrument to be a measure of collaborative 
effort, establishing validity for the instrument. 
All of these studies were conducted on the 2nd edition, the previous version of the Wilder 
Collaboration Factors Inventory from 2001 (Mattessich et al., 2001) that included 20 of the 
current 22 factors being used in this study. The two factors that were added in the most recent 
(2018) version of the Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory were: (1) Evaluation and 
continuous learning; and (2) Engaged stakeholders (Mattessich & Johnson, 2018).  
 
3.2.7 - Data Collection Procedures 
Policies pertaining to the overall ethical treatment of human subjects are enforced by the 
Virginia Commonwealth University Institutional Review Board (VCU-IRB). VCU IRB approval 
was obtained on August 6, 2019. (Appendix C)  
The population of this research was conducted with adults only. Consent was outlined in 
all population communication and within the online survey. The survey provided anonymity of 
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the respondent’s name. It was assured to survey respondents that their survey responses would 
remain confidential as an individual response and would be reported in aggregate by 
partnership/board, sector and whether a partner was mandated and non-mandated. Any results 
reported on a WDB level remained anonymous. The data collected for this study was protected 
electronically by the use of computer passwords. No personally identifying information was 
obtained from any participant. Data for this study was collected online using the survey 
electronic software available from REDCap.  Electronic data collection and storage allows for 
easier and faster data collection (Benfield & Szlemko, 2006).  
Before the survey was sent out, a pilot test of the survey was done with several workforce 
development professionals. Through the pilot test, the amount of time to take the survey was 
gauged and the pilot was used to make minor word changes which made the survey instructions 
less ambiguous.  
The survey was sent to all 15 WDB Executive Directors in Virginia. Before the survey 
was sent to the WDB Executive Directors, the researcher contacted the Virginia Association of 
Workforce Directors (VAWD) co-chairs to inform them of the study and ask for their support. 
After support was obtained, the researcher contacted the 15 WDB Executive Directors by email 
(Appendix D) to inform them of the study, to gain support for the survey distribution and to find 
out if there were any questions regarding the study.  The researcher gave the WDB Executive 
Director an opportunity to set up a time to speak by phone about the study if there was a desire to 
do so and to answer any additional questions. After all of the Executive Directors consented to 
participate in the study by responding with affirmation via email, they were sent an introductory 
email (Appendix E) with the survey distribution instructions and the online survey to send to all 
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of their board members. The introductory email explained the purpose of the study and the 
survey instrument.  
All respondents were asked to fill out the online survey within a three-week period. Nine 
members were listed as serving on two WDBs that were in close proximity of each other. The 
survey instructions asked respondents to fill out a survey for each WDB they were serving on. 
Reminder emails (Appendix F) were sent one week after the survey was initially distributed by 
the Executive Director. The distribution dates were confirmed by the Executive Directors. A 
second reminder email (Appendix G) was sent a week after the first reminder email, noting that 
the survey timeframe would be closing soon. If the response rate was less than 30% of any 
particular WDB by week two, the researcher emailed the Executive Director to inquire about any 
additional strategies to obtain more survey responses. To incentivize individuals to participate, 
the researcher agreed to provide survey results at an aggregate level only for individual WDBs 
and for Virginia across all WDBs.  
 
3.2.8 - Data Analysis Procedures 
Once the timeframe closed for survey responses, the researcher cleaned the data. If a 
respondent did not complete the survey, the responses to the survey questions that were 
completed were used and pairwise deletion was used in data analysis. The researcher excluded 
any surveys that did not contain the demographic and geographical information being asked. One 
survey respondent responded that they were in both, the private and public sectors. Another 
survey respondent responded that they did not know if they were required to be on the board. 
Because these responses were outliers and would create a unique group of one for the variables 
of sector and mandated/non-mandated participation status, the researcher removed these two 
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responses from the survey data. After the data was collected, descriptive and inferential 
statistical data analysis was conducted.   
 
3.3 - Research Questions and Hypotheses  
 There are two research questions guiding this study. They relate to the perception of 
collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners at aggregate and disaggregate 
levels.  These and the ensuing hypotheses are explained below. 
  
3.3.1 - Research Question 1 
At an aggregate level, are there differences in the perception of collaboration between mandated 
and non-mandated partners?  Three hypotheses were tested.  
 
3.3.1.1 Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 tests whether the perception of collaboration is stronger comparing the aggregate 
groups of mandated partners and non-mandated partners.  An independent t-test was done to 
determine the difference between the two groups.  
 
H10: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do not have a stronger 
perception of collaboration than mandated partners.  
H1A: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do have a stronger 
perception of collaboration than mandated partners. 
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3.3.1.2 - Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 tests the difference in perception of collaboration between mandated partners only 
and from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors.  A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was done to determine variances between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration. 
 
H20: The perception of collaboration is not different for mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
H2A: The perception of collaboration is different for mandated partners from the private, public 
and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.3.1.3 - Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 tests the difference in perception of collaboration between the non-mandated 
partners only from the private, public, and nonprofit sectors. A one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was done to determine variances between the non-mandated partners’ perception of 
collaboration. 
 
H30: The perception of collaboration is not different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
H3A: The perception of collaboration is different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
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3.3.2 - Research Question 2 
The second research question continues the same analysis but after separating 
collaboration into four component parts using principal component analysis.  The components 
are: (1) “Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy;” 
and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” Each hypothesis (below) represents testing for one 
component.  For Hypotheses 4-7, an independent t-test was used to determine the difference 
between the two groups (mandated or not).  For Hypotheses 8-11, a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to find the relationship between mandated partners’ perception of 
collaboration that belong to the following sectors: private, public, or nonprofit for each 
component.  Hypotheses 12-15 used the same approach, but for non-mandated partners only. 
 
3.3.2.1 - Hypothesis 4 
H40: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than 
mandated partners. 
H4A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than 
mandated partners.  
  
3.3.2.2 - Hypothesis 5 
H50: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” 
than mandated partners.  
H5A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” than 
mandated partners. 
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3.3.2.3 - Hypothesis 6 
H60: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than 
mandated partners.  
H6A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than 
mandated partners.  
 
3.3.2.4 - Hypothesis 7 
H70: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than 
mandated partners. 
H7A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than 
mandated partners. 
 
3.3.2.5 - Hypothesis 8  
H80: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H8A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.3.2.6 - Hypothesis 9 
H90: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H9A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
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3.3.2.7 - Hypothesis 10 
H100: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H10A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.3.2.8 - Hypothesis 11 
H110: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H11A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.3.2.9 - Hypotheses 12 
H120: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for non-mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H12A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for non-mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.3.2.10 - Hypotheses 13 
H130: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for non-mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H13A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
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3.3.2.11 - Hypothesis 14 
H140: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H14A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for non-mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.3.2.12 - Hypothesis 15 
H150: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H15A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for non-mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
3.4 - Summary of Hypotheses 
Table 5 presents a summary of the 15 hypotheses and the corresponding statistical tests 
that were performed.  Table 6 shows the hypotheses and their relationship in diagrammatic form.    
 
Table 5 
Summary of Hypotheses and Statistical Tests  
 Hypotheses Statistical Test 
H10 In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated 
partners do not have a stronger perception of collaboration 
than mandated partners.  
 
Independent Samples 
t-test 
H1A In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated 
partners do have a stronger perception of collaboration 
than mandated partners.  
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The following two hypotheses relate to collaboration from the private, public and nonprofit 
sectors for mandated partners (H2) and non-mandated partners (H3). 
 
H20 The perception of collaboration is not different for 
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit 
sectors. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H2A The perception of collaboration is different for mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H30 The perception of collaboration is not different for non-
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit 
sectors. 
 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H3A The perception of collaboration is different for non-
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit 
sectors. 
 
The following four hypotheses (H4, H5, H6, H7) relate to the collaboration components derived 
from principal components analysis and the differences in them between mandated and non-
mandated partners. 
 
H40 Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception 
of” Partnership Capacity” than mandated partners. 
 
Independent Samples 
t-test H4A Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of” 
Partnership Capacity” than mandated partners.  
H50 Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception 
of” Partnership Responsiveness” than mandated partners. 
Independent Samples 
t-test 
H5A Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of” 
Partnership Responsiveness” than mandated partners.  
H60 Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception 
of “Partnership Legitimacy” than mandated partners. 
 
Independent Samples 
t-test H6 A Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of 
“Partnership Legitimacy” than mandated partners.  
H70 Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception 
of “Partnership Momentum” than mandated partners. 
Independent Samples 
t-test 
H7A Non-mandated partners do have a stronger perception of 
“Partnership Momentum” than mandated partners. 
 
The following four hypotheses (H8, H9, H10, H11) relate to the collaboration components 
derived from principal components analysis and the differences between only the mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
H80 The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different 
for mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
   
 
 
 
 
44 
H8A The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for 
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit 
sectors. 
H90 The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not 
different for mandated partners from the private, public 
and nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H9A The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is 
different for mandated partners from the private, public 
and nonprofit sectors. 
H100 The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not 
different for mandated partners from the private, public 
and nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H10A The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different 
for mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
H110 The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not 
different for mandated partners from the private, public 
and nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H11A The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different 
for mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
 
The following four hypotheses (H12, H13, H14, H15) relate to the collaboration components 
derived from principal components analysis and the differences between only the non-mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
H120 The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different 
for non-mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H12A The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for 
non-mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
H130 The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not 
different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H13A The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is 
different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
H140 The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not 
different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H14A The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different 
for non-mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
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H150 
 
The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not 
different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) 
H15A 
 
The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different 
for non-mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. 
 
 
Figure 2 
Path Diagram representing Hypotheses  
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3.5 - Limitations 
This study only explored the perceptions of collaboration from regional workforce boards in 
Virginia and was limited to the finite population of the 15 WDBs in Virginia. As a result, 
applying the findings and making generalized conclusions to other populations and partnerships 
should be done cautiously. The data in this study is self-reported data, therefore, answers from 
survey respondents could be influenced by this. Additionally, this study was cross sectional, yet 
it studied phenomena (collaboration, trust) that may evolve and change over time.  
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Chapter 4: Study Results 
 
4.1 - Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the principal components analysis along with the 
survey response rate at an aggregate and partnership/board level, an overview of survey 
demographics and the statistical results of the hypotheses testing. Because of the importance of 
trust in this study, prior to hypotheses testing, two linear regressions were run; one for the two 
questions on the survey representing “Mutual respect, understanding, and trust,” representing the 
variable, “Trust” and one for the length of time served on the board, representing the variable, 
“Time.” This was done in order to determine how much the dependent variable, “Perception of 
Collaboration,” was explained by these variables.  The “Time” variable explained only 1.2% of 
the “Perception of Collaboration” with a significance of .230, and therefore was not further 
explored. The variable “Trust” explained 55.30% of the “Perception of Collaboration,” with a 
significance of .000. After this test, “Trust” was confirmed to be the most impactful variable. 
The survey results section explains the other 44.7% of the “Perception of Collaboration” that was 
not explained. 
 
4.2 - Principal Components Analysis Results 
Prior to performing the principal components analysis, the suitability of the data was 
assessed. Inspection of the correlation matrix revealed that no variables were competing for 
multicollinearity and therefore, all variables were retained.  The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy was .927, exceeding the recommended value of .6 (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2006) and the Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity reached statistical significance (𝜒 (231) = 1827.60, p 
<.001), supporting the factorability of the correlation matrix. Finally, the communalities were all 
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above .4, further confirming that each variable shared some common variance with other 
variables. Given these indicators, the principle components analysis was conducted with all 22 
variables.  
The principle components analysis revealed the presence of four components with 
eigenvalues exceeding 1, with Component 1 explaining 49.37%, Component 2 explaining 5.87%, 
Component 3 explaining 5.31%, and Component 4 explaining 4.92% of the variance respectively 
(Appendix H).  An inspection of the scree plot (Appendix I) revealed a break after the fourth 
component where Eigenvalues reached below 1.0. This confirmed the decision to retain four 
components. Appendix J shows the unrotated loadings of the variables on the four components.  
Rotation was used to improve the interpretability of the results and varimax rotation was 
requested. The Rotated Component Matrix (Appendix K) revealed that all components had 
positive loadings. Interpretation of the rotated factor loadings revealed four patterns of loadings. 
Component 1 included 13 variables with components from .816 - .476: (1) Skilled Leadership 
(.816); (2) Adaptability (.780); (3) Concrete and attainable goals (.735); (4) Evaluation and 
continuous learning (.726); (5) Shared Vision (.721); (6) Open and frequent communication 
(.687); (7) Mutual respect, understanding, and trust (.644); (8) Established informal relationships 
and communication links (.637); (9) Appropriate pace of development (.605); (10) Engaged 
stakeholders (.569); (11) Unique purpose (.539); (12) Development of clear roles and policy 
guidelines (.498); and (13) Members share a stake in both process and outcome (476). 
Component 1 was renamed to be “Partnership Capacity”. 
Component 2 consisted of four variables clustered together from .847 - .497: (1) Multiple 
layers of Participation (.847); (2) Flexibility (.582); (3) Appropriate cross section of members 
(.563); and (4) Ability to compromise (.497). Component 2 was renamed to be “Partnership 
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Responsiveness”. Component 3 consisted of two variables with component loadings between 
.807 - .749: (1) Collaborative group seen as a legitimate leader in the community (.807); and (2) 
History of collaboration or cooperation in the community (.749). Component 3 was renamed to 
be “Partnership Legitimacy”. Component 4 consisted of three variables with component loadings 
from .713 - .524: (1) Favorable political and social climate (.713); (2) Members see collaboration 
as being in their self-interest (.709); and (3) Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and time (.524). 
Component 4 was renamed to “Partnership Momentum.”  
 
4.3 - Survey Results 
 The following two sections outline the survey response rates and the demographic 
characteristics of the survey respondents.  
 
4.3.1 - Survey Distribution and Response Rates 
 Individuals were selected for participation if they were serving as a board member on at 
least one of the 15 WDBs in Virginia. A total of 459 participants were reached through their 
Executive Directors and asked to fill out the survey online. A total of 127 surveys were taken 
(27.7%) and 3 surveys were excluded (N=124). One was excluded because the survey 
respondent did not indicate which WDB they were serving on, but rather, filled out which 
committee they were serving on for the WDB. The other two respondents were removed because 
they did not fall into the primary variable categories of sector and mandatory/non-mandatory 
participation status. One respondent indicated that they were a part of the private and public 
sector. This may have occurred because some private sector representatives are also serving as a 
publicly elected official. The survey was adjusted to allow survey respondents to enter multiple 
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categories for participation in a sector, realizing that they could be a part of more than one sector. 
This situation was presented during the pilot study; therefore, an adjustment was made to allow 
multiple entries so that the respondent would not choose to avoid this question. The other 
respondent answered that they did not know whether they were required to be on the board or 
not. For one WDB, there were no respondents, therefore, only 14 WDBs were represented in the 
survey. Five respondents did not completely fill out the survey, however, the responses for 
questions that were answered were used in the data analysis. The survey distribution and 
response rates are presented in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6 
 
Survey Distribution and Response Rates 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
WDB Name 
 
Surveys 
Distributed 
 
 
Surveys 
Completed 
 
Response Rate 
(%) 
 
South Central  
 
23 
 
14 
 
60.9 
Greater Peninsula Region  39 20 51.3 
Central Region 31 14 45.2 
Alexandria/Arlington  32 12 37.5 
Bay Consortium Region 24 9 37.5 
Southwest Region 35 12 34.3 
Crater Region 21 7 33.3 
Shenandoah Valley Region 34 8 23.5 
Piedmont Region 23 5 21.7 
Capital Region 30 6 20.0 
Hampton Roads Region 43 8 18.6 
Northern Region 44 7 15.9 
Blue Ridge Region 25 2 8.0 
West Piedmont 27 2 7.4 
New River/Mount Rogers Region 28 0 0.0 
 
 
Total 
 
 
459 
 
 
126* 
 
 
27.7 
*127 surveys were completed, but 1 survey respondent did not identify their WDB 
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4.3.2 - Survey Demographics 
 
The majority of the survey respondents were from the public sector (37.8%), have served 
on the board for 49 or more months (37.8%) and indicated that they were not required to be on 
the board (78.7%). The second highest sector to respond was the private sector (33.9%). The 
second highest response for time served on the board was 25-48 months. Demographic 
characteristics of survey respondents are presented in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents 
 
 
Sector  
 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent (%) 
    Private Sector 43 33.9 
    Public Sector  48 37.8 
    Nonprofit Sector 35 27.6 
    Private & Public Sector 1 0.8 
 
Total 
 
127 
 
100.0 
 
Time Served on the Board  
    0-12 months 20 15.7 
    13-24 months 24 18.9 
    25-48 months 35 27.6 
    49+ months 48 37.8 
 
Total 
 
127 
 
100.0 
 
Required to be on the Board  
    Yes 26 20.5 
    No                      100 78.7 
    I don’t know 1 0.8 
 
Total 
 
127 
 
100.0 
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After removing the three survey respondents, (N = 124), 26 respondents (21%)  reported 
that they were required to be on the board and 98 (79%) reported that they were not. The 
frequency for the sectors was as follows: private sector - 42 (33.9%); public sector - 48 (38.7%); 
and the nonprofit sector - 34 (27.4%). The frequency for time served on the board was as 
follows: 0-12 months – 19 (23.6%); 13-24 months – 24 (29.8%); 25-48 months – 33 (40.9%); 
and 49+ months – 48 (59.5%). 
 
4.4 - Results for Research Question and Hypotheses 
The results of this study are reported for the state of Virginia as a whole, and not by 
individual partnership/board. There were two research questions guiding this study. They relate 
to the perception of collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners at aggregate and 
disaggregate levels.  These and the ensuing hypotheses are explained below. 
 
4.4.1 - Research Question 1 
At an aggregate level, are there differences in the perception of collaboration between mandated 
and non-mandated partners?  Three hypotheses were tested.  
 
4.4.1.1 - Hypothesis 1 
H10: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do not have a stronger 
perception of collaboration than mandated partners.  
H1A: In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners have a stronger perception 
of collaboration than mandated partners. 
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Results 
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the mean for mandated 
partners differed significantly compared to the mean for non-mandated partners. The assumption 
of homogeneity of variance was assessed by the Levene test, F = .549, p = .460; this indicated no 
significant violation of the equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed 
version of the t test was used. The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = .23, p = .818, one-
tailed. However, the mandated partners mean (M = .095, SD = 1.681) was 0.1 higher than the 
non-mandated partners mean (M = -.007, SD = 2.086). Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
accepted, and the alternative hypothesis was rejected. Table 8 details the results. 
 
Table 8 
Independent t-test for Mandated/Non-mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration 
 N Mean Std. Deviation df t Sig. 
 
Mandated Partners 
 
26 
 
.095 
 
1.681 
 
122 
 
.230 
 
.818 
 
Non-mandated 
Partners 
 
 
98 
 
-.007 
 
2.086 
 
122 
 
.230 
 
.818 
 
 
4.4.1.2 - Hypothesis 2 
H20: The perception of collaboration is not different for mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
H2A: The perception of collaboration is different for mandated partners from the private, public 
and nonprofit sectors. 
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Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between mandated partners that belonged to one of the following sectors: private, public, or 
nonprofit. Prior to the analysis, the Levene test for homogeneity of variance was used to examine 
if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no 
significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .127, p = .881. The mandated private sector mean (M 
= .940, SD = 1.603) was 0.921 higher than the mandated public sector mean (M = .019, SD = 
1.818) and 1.052 higher than the nonprofit mean (M = -.112, SD = 1.424). The mandated public 
sector mean was 0.131 higher than the mandated nonprofit sector mean. There was a difference 
between group means as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .421, p = .661 (p < 
.05). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. 
Table 9 details the results. 
 
Table 9 
One-way ANOVA for Mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration by Sector  
 
  
   Mean 
 
Sum of Squares 
 
df 
 
Mean Square 
 
F 
 
Sig. 
  2.498 25 1.249 .421 .661 
Private Sector .940      
Public Sector .019      
Nonprofit Sector -.112      
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4.4.1.3 - Hypothesis 3 
H30: The perception of collaboration is not different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
H3A: The perception of collaboration is different for non-mandated partners from the private, 
public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between non-mandated partners that belonged to one of the following sectors: private, public, or 
nonprofit. Prior to the analysis, the Levene test for homogeneity of variance was used to examine 
if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no 
significant violation was found: F(2,95) = .269, p = .765. The non-mandated private sector mean 
(M = -.493, SD = 2.380) was 0.700 lower than the non-mandated public sector mean (M = .206, 
SD = 1.962) and .927 lower than the nonprofit mean (M = .434, SD = 1.669). The non-mandated 
public sector mean was .228 lower than the non-mandated nonprofit sector mean. There was a 
difference between group means as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = 1.881, p = 
.158 (p < .05). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was 
accepted. Table 10 details the results. 
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Table 10 
One-way ANOVA for Non-mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration by Sector  
 
  
   Mean 
 
 
Sum of Squares 
 
   df 
 
Mean Square 
 
  F 
 
Sig. 
  16.075 97 8.037 1.881 .158 
Private Sector -.493      
Public Sector .206      
Nonprofit Sector .434      
 
Hypotheses 1-3 were related to research question 1. The first hypothesis that non-
mandated partners had a stronger perception of collaboration than mandated partners was not 
supported. However, the mean difference between the mandated and non-mandated partners was 
only .102. Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the 
study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population. 
Hypothesis 2 speculated that there was a difference in collaboration between the sectors 
for mandated partners and that hypothesis was supported. Hypothesis 3 speculated that there was 
a difference in collaboration between the sectors for non-mandated partners and that hypothesis 
also was supported. The highest difference of 1.052 was between the private and nonprofit 
sectors. The difference between the private and public sectors was .921 and .013 for the public 
and nonprofit sectors. Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning 
since the study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a 
population 
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Hypothesis 3 speculated that there was also a difference in collaboration between the 
sectors for non-mandated partners and that hypothesis was supported. The greatest difference of 
.927 was between the private and nonprofit sectors. The difference between the nonprofit and 
public sectors was .228 and the difference between the public and private sectors was .699. 
Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the study was 
conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population.  
In summary, mandated partners had a stronger perception of collaboration than non-
mandated partners, but only slightly more. This contradicts the literature. There was a greater 
difference between mandated partners and non-mandated partners with regard to sector. The 
nonprofit and public sectors had a stronger perception of collaboration for the non-mandated 
partners group and the private sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for the mandated 
partners group.  
One interesting finding is that the private sector had the strongest perception of 
collaboration for the mandated partners and the weakest perception of collaboration for the non-
mandated partners. The public sector’s survey results were more similar for both mandated and 
non-mandated partners. The nonprofit sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for non-
mandated partners and a weaker perception of collaboration for mandated partners. The biggest 
difference was between the private sector and then the nonprofit sectors, with a marginal 
difference for the public sector, overall.   
The nonprofit sector was also the opposite and had a stronger perception of collaboration 
for the non-mandated partners and a weaker perception of collaboration for the mandated 
partners. Table 11 summarizes by sector who (mandated or non-mandated partners) had the 
strongest or weakest perception of collaboration.  
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Table 11 
 
Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration for Mandated and Non-Mandated Partners 
by Sector  
 
 
      Sector 
 
 
Strongest Perception of Collaboration 
 
Weakest Perception of Collaboration 
 
Private 
 
Mandated Partners 
 
Non-Mandated Partners 
 
Public 
 
Non-Mandated Partners 
 
Mandated Partners 
 
Nonprofit 
 
Non-Mandated Partners 
 
Mandated Partners 
 
 
 
4.4.2 - Results for Research Question 2 
The second research question continues the same analysis but after separating 
collaboration into four component parts using principal component analysis.  The components 
are: (1) “Partnership Capacity,” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness,” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy,” 
and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” Each hypothesis (below) represents testing for one 
component.  For Hypotheses 4-7, an independent t-test was used to determine the difference 
between the two groups (mandated or not).  For Hypotheses 8-11, a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was used to find the relationship between mandated partners’ perception of 
collaboration that belong to the following sectors: private, public, or nonprofit for each 
component.  Hypotheses 12-15 used a similar approach, but for non-mandated partners. 
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4.4.2.1 - Hypothesis 4 
H40: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than 
mandated partners.  
H4A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Capacity” than 
mandated partners. 
  
Results 
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated 
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by 
principal components analysis differed significantly compared to the means for non-mandated 
partners. For Component 1, “Partnership Capacity,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance 
was assessed by the Levene test, F = 1.119, p = .292; this indicated no significant violation of the 
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used. 
The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = -.265, p = .792, one-tailed. Yet, the mandated 
partners mean (M = -.033, SD = .828) was 0.058 lower than the non-mandated partners mean (M 
= .025, SD = 1.046), therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis 
was accepted. Table 12 details the results. 
 
4.4.2.2 - Hypothesis 5 
H50: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” 
than mandated partners. 
H5A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” than 
mandated partners. 
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Results 
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated 
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by 
principal components analysis differed compared to the means for non-mandated partners. For 
Component 2, “Partnership Responsiveness,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
assessed by the Levene test, F = .179, p = .673; this indicated no significant violation of the 
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used. 
The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = -1.053, p = .295, one-tailed. Yet, the mandated 
partners mean (M = -.187, SD = .993) was .233 lower than the non-mandated partners mean (M = 
.047 SD = 1.01), therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was 
accepted. Table 12 details the results. 
 
4.4.2.3 - Hypothesis 6 
H60: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than 
mandated partners. 
H6A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” than 
mandated partners. 
 
Results 
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated 
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by 
principal components analysis differed compared to the means for non-mandated partners. For 
Component 3, “Partnership Legitimacy,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
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assessed by the Levene test, F = 3.564, p = .061; this indicated no significant violation of the 
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used. 
The means did differ significantly, t (122) = 2.137, p = .035, one-tailed. The mandated partners 
mean (M = .374, SD = .700) was 0.470 higher than the non-mandated partners mean (M = -.094, 
SD = 1.055).), therefore, the null hypothesis was accepted, and the alternative hypothesis was 
rejected. Table 12 details the results. 
 
4.4.2.4 - Hypothesis 7 
H70: Non-mandated partners do not have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than 
mandated partners.  
H7A: Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership Momentum” than 
mandated partners. 
 
Results 
An independent samples t test was performed to assess whether the means for mandated 
partners perception of collaboration for the four collaboration components determined by 
principal components analysis differed compared to the means for non-mandated partners. For 
Component 4, “Partnership Momentum,” the assumption of homogeneity of variance was 
assessed by the Levene test, F = .005, p = .942; this indicated no significant violation of the 
equal variance assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used. 
The means did not differ significantly, t (122) = -.331, p = .741, one-tailed. Yet, the mandated 
partners mean (M = -.059, SD = .100) was .074 lower than the non-mandated partners mean (M = 
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.014, SD = 1.009). Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis 
was accepted. Table 12 details the results. 
 
 
Table 12 
 
Independent t-test for Mandated/Non-mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration using 
Components produced from Principal Components Analysis 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation df t Sig. 
 
Component 1  
“Partnership Capacity” 
Mandated Partners 
 
26 
 
-0.334 
 
.828 
 
122 
 
-.265 
 
.792 
 
Component 1  
“Partnership Capacity” 
Non-mandated Partners 
 
 
98 
 
.025 
 
1.046 
 
122 
 
-.265 
 
.792 
 
Component 2  
“Partnership 
Responsiveness” 
Mandated Partners 
 
 
26 
 
-.187 
 
.993 
 
122 
 
-1.053 
 
.295 
Component 2  
“Partnership 
Responsiveness” 
Non-mandated Partners 
 
 
98 
 
.0471 
 
1.010 
 
122 
 
-1.053 
 
295 
 
Component 3  
“Partnership Legitimacy” 
Mandated Partners 
 
26 
 
.374 
 
.700 
 
122 
 
2.137 
 
.035* 
 
Component 3  
“Partnership Legitimacy” 
Non-mandated Partners 
 
 
98 
 
-.094 
 
1.055 
 
122 
 
2.137 
 
.035* 
 
Component 4  
“Partnership Momentum” 
Mandated Partners 
 
26 
 
-.0591 
 
.999 
 
122 
 
-.331 
. 
741 
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Component 4 
“Partnership Momentum” 
Non-mandated Partners 
 
98 
 
.0144 
 
1.009 
 
122 
 
-.331 
 
.741 
*denotes statistical significance p < .05 
 
For Hypotheses 4-7, the only significant result of the four components, was for 
Hypothesis 6 relating to “Partnership Legitimacy,” with a mean difference of .468.  Although the 
means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the study was conducted with a 
finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population. 
After “Partnership Legitimacy,” the next biggest difference between mandated and non-
mandated partners was for “Partnership Responsiveness” with a mean difference of .234, then 
“Partnership Momentum,” with a mean difference of .073 and finally, “Partnership Capacity,” 
with a mean difference of .058. For Hypotheses 4-7, non-mandated partners had a stronger 
perception of collaboration for all components, except “Partnership Legitimacy,” This was for 
the most part, expected, based on the literature for mandated and non-mandated partners.  
 
The following four hypotheses pertain to mandated partners only. 
 
4.4.2.5 - Hypothesis 8 
H80: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H8A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
64 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit. For Component 1, “Partnership Capacity,” the Levene test for 
homogeneity of variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the 
homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: 
F(2,23) = 1.306, p = .290. There was no statistically significant difference between group means 
for “Partnership Capacity” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .585, p = .565 (p 
< .05). However, the private sector mean (M = -.523, SD = 1.38) was .536 lower than the public 
sector mean (M = .014 SD = .666) and 0.600 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .078 SD 
= 1.39). The nonprofit sector was .064 higher than the public sector. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results. 
 
4.4.2.6 - Hypothesis 9 
H90: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H9A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
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determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit.  
For Component 2, “Partnership Responsiveness,” the Levene test for homogeneity of 
variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance 
assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .857, p = .857. There 
was no statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership 
Responsiveness” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .714, p = .500 (p < .05). 
However, the private sector mean (M = .333, SD = .919) was .500 higher than the public sector 
mean (M = -.165 SD = 1.026) and .840 higher than the nonprofit sector mean (M = -.509 SD = 
.967). The public sector was .344 higher than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results. 
 
4.4.2.7 - Hypothesis 10 
H100: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H10A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit.  
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For Component 3, “Partnership Legitimacy,” the Levene test for homogeneity of variance 
was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption 
across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .166, p = .848. There was no 
statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership Legitimacy” as 
determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = .878, p = .429 (p < .05). However, the private 
sector mean (M = .240, SD = .798) was .040 lower than the public sector mean (M = .280 SD = 
.622) and .466 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .707 SD = .885). The nonprofit sector 
was .430 higher than the public sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results. 
 
4.4.2.8 - Hypothesis 11 
H110: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H11A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit.  
For Component 4, “Partnership Momentum,” the Levene test for homogeneity of 
variance was used to examine where there were serious violations of the homogeneity of 
   
 
 
 
 
67 
variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,23) = .581, p = 
.568. There was no statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership 
Momentum” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,23) = 1.809, p = .186 (p < .05). 
However, the private sector mean (M = .889, SD = .461) was .100 higher than the public sector 
mean (M = -.110 SD = .1.025) and 1.277 higher than the nonprofit sector mean (M = -.388 SD = 
.927). The public sector was .277 higher than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 13 details the results. 
 
 
Table 13 
 
One-way ANOVA Mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration using Components produced 
from Principal Components Analysis 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. df F Sig. 
 
Component 1 “Partnership Capacity” 
 
      
Mandated Private Sector 
 
3 -.523 1.384 25 .585 .565 
Mandated Public Sector 
 
17 .014 .666 25 .585 .565 
Mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
6 .078 1.037 25 .585 .565 
 
Component 2 “Partnership Responsiveness” 
      
 
Mandated Private Sector 
 
3 
 
.333 
 
.919 
 
25 
 
.714 
 
.500 
 
Mandated Public Sector 
 
 
17 
 
-.165 
 
1.03 
 
25 
 
.714 
 
.500 
Mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
6 -.509 .967 25 .714 .500 
 
Component 3 “Partnership Legitimacy” 
      
 
Mandated Private Sector 
 
 
3 
 
.240 
 
.798 
 
25 
 
.878 
 
.429 
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Mandated Public Sector 
 
17 .280 .622 25 .878 .429 
Mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
6 .707 .885 25 .878 .429 
 
Component 4 “Partnership Momentum” 
      
 
Mandated Private Sector 
 
3 
 
.889 
 
.461 
 
25 
 
1.809 
 
.186 
 
Mandated Public Sector 
 
17 
 
-.110 
 
1.025 
 
25 
 
1.809 
 
.186 
 
Mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
6 
 
-.388 
 
.927 
 
25 
 
1.809 
 
.186 
 
Hypotheses 8-11 evaluated the four collaboration components for mandated partners 
only. For the nonprofit sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership 
Legitimacy,” and the weakest perception was for “Partnership Momentum.” For the private 
sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Momentum,” and the 
weakest perception was for “Partnership Capacity.” For the public sector, the strongest 
perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Legitimacy” and the weakest perception was for 
“Partnership Responsiveness.”  The private and nonprofit sectors had the stronger or weaker 
perceptions of collaboration for each component. The greatest difference, (1.217), was observed 
for “Partnership Momentum,” and was between the private and nonprofit sectors. “Partnership 
Momentum,” flipped for the private and nonprofit sectors in order of the strongest and weakest 
perception of collaboration. The private sector had the strongest perception of collaboration of 
the mandated partners, yet the weakest for the non-mandated partners. The nonprofit sector had 
the strongest perception of collaboration of the non-mandated partners, yet the weakest for the 
mandated partners. 
The next largest difference (.842) was observed for “Partnership Responsiveness,” and 
then “Partnership Capacity,” (.601), followed by “Partnership Legitimacy,” (.467), all between 
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the nonprofit and private sectors. Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have 
meaning since the study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled 
from a population 
In summary, “Partnership Momentum” had the largest overall difference. The private and 
nonprofit sectors had the strongest perception of collaboration for the mandated partners. The 
public sector was in between for all four components. For all components, the private and 
nonprofit sectors had the biggest differences. Table 14 provides a summary. 
 
Table 14 
Comparison of Collaboration Components for Mandated Partners  
“Partnership Capacity” “Partnership Responsiveness” “Partnership Legitimacy” “Partnership Momentum” 
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = .078); 
 
Difference: .064  
 
Public Sector 
(M = .014); 
 
Difference: .537  
 
Private Sector 
(M = -.523) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .601 
(H8) 
 
Private Sector 
(M = .333); 
 
Difference: .498  
 
Public Sector 
(M = -.165); 
 
Difference: .344 
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = -.509) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .842 
(H9) 
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = .707); 
 
Difference: .427  
 
Public Sector 
 (M = .280); 
 
Difference: .04 
 
Private Sector 
(M = .240) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .467 
(H10) 
 
Private Sector 
(M = .889); 
 
Difference: .999  
 
Public Sector 
 (M = -.110); 
 
Difference: .278  
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = -.388) 
 
 
Overall Difference: 1.217 
(H11) 
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The following four hypotheses pertain to non-mandated partners only. 
 
4.4.2.9 - Hypothesis 12 
H120: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is not different for non-mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H12A: The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for non-mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit. For Component 1, “Partnership Capacity,” the Levene test for 
homogeneity of variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the 
homogeneity of variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: 
F(2,95) = 2.800 p = .066. There was no statistically significant difference between group means 
for “Partnership Capacity” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = .432, p = .650 (p 
< .05). Yet, the private sector mean (M = -.091, SD = 1.371) was .160 lower than the public 
sector mean (M = .069 SD = .747) and .231 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .140 SD = 
.796). The public sector was .007 lower than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
was rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 15 details the results. 
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4.4.2.10 - Hypothesis 13 
H130: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is not different for non-mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H13A: The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit.  
For Component 2, “Partnership Responsiveness,” the Levene test for homogeneity of 
variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance 
assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,95) = .552, p = .578. There 
was no statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership 
Responsiveness” as determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = .411, p = .664 (p < .05). 
Yet, the private sector mean (M = .153, SD = 1.110) was .220 higher than the public sector mean 
(M = -.067 SD = 1.033) and .127 higher than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .026 SD = .846). 
The public sector was .093 lower than the nonprofit sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 15 details the results. 
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4.4.2.11 - Hypothesis 14 
H140: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is not different for non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H14A: The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for non-mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit.  
For Component 3, “Partnership Legitimacy,” the Levene test for homogeneity of variance 
was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance assumption 
across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,95) = 1.920, p = .152. There was no 
statistically significant difference between group means for “Partnership Legitimacy” as 
determined by the one-way ANOVA, F (2,95) = .315, p = .730 (p < .05). Yet, the private sector 
mean (M = -.197, SD = 1.25) was .189 lower than the public sector mean  
(M = -.008 SD = .976) and .151 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = -.046 SD = .846). The 
nonprofit sector was .038 lower than the public sector. Therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected, and the alternative hypothesis was accepted. Table 15 details the results. 
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4.4.2.12 - Hypothesis 15 
H150: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is not different for non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
H15A: The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for non-mandated partners from 
the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Results 
A one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was computed to determine the variances 
between non-mandated partners’ perception of collaboration for the collaboration components 
determined by principal components analysis that belonged to one of the following groups: 
private, public or nonprofit.  
For Component 4, “Partnership Momentum,” the Levene test for homogeneity of 
variance was used to examine if there were serious violations of the homogeneity of variance 
assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F(2,95) = 1.235, p = .295. The 
private sector mean (M = -.357, SD = .950) was .569 lower than the public sector mean (M = 
.212 SD = 1.124) and .671 lower than the nonprofit sector mean (M = .314 SD = .803). The 
public sector was .102 lower than the nonprofit sector. There was a statistically significant 
difference between group means for “Partnership Momentum” as determined by the one-way 
ANOVA, F (2,95) = 4.826, p = .010 (p < .05). Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted. Table 15 details the results.  
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Table 15 
 
One-way ANOVA Non-Mandated Partners’ Perception of Collaboration using Components 
produced from Principal Components Analysis 
 
 N Mean Std. Dev. df F Sig. 
 
Component 1 “Partnership Capacity” 
      
 
Non-mandated Private Sector 
 
39 
 
-.091 
 
1.371 
 
97 
 
.432 
 
.650 
 
Non-mandated Public Sector 
 
31 
 
.069 
 
.069 
 
97 
 
.432 
 
.650 
 
Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
 
28 
 
.140 
 
.140 
 
97 
 
.432 
 
.650 
 
Component 2 “Partnership Responsiveness” 
      
 
Non-mandated Private Sector 
 
39 
 
.153 
 
1.11 
 
97 
 
.411 
 
.664 
 
Non-mandated Public Sector 
 
31 
 
-.067 
 
1.03 
 
97 
 
.411 
 
.664 
 
Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
 
28 
 
.026 
 
.846 
 
97 
 
.411 
 
.664 
 
Component 3 “Partnership Legitimacy” 
      
 
Non-mandated Private Sector 
 
39 
 
-.197 
 
1.250 
 
97 
 
.315 
 
.730 
 
Non-mandated Public Sector 
 
31 
 
-.008 
 
.976 
 
97 
 
.315 
 
.730 
 
Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
 
28 
 
-.046 
 
.846 
 
97 
 
.315 
 
.730 
 
Component 4 “Partnership Momentum” 
      
 
Non-mandated Private Sector 
 
39 
 
-.357 
 
.950 
 
97 
 
4.826 
 
.010* 
 
Non-mandated Public Sector 
 
31 
 
.212 
 
1.124 
 
97 
 
4.826 
 
.010* 
 
Non-mandated Nonprofit Sector 
 
 
28 
 
.314 
 
.803 
 
97 
 
4.826 
 
.010* 
*denotes statistical significance p < .05 
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Hypotheses 12 -15 evaluated the four components of collaboration for non-mandated 
partners only. For the nonprofit sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for 
“Partnership Momentum,” and the weakest perception was for “Partnership Legitimacy.” For the 
private sector, the strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Responsiveness,” 
and the weakest perception was for “Partnership Momentum.” For the public sector, the 
strongest perception of collaboration was for “Partnership Momentum” and the weakest 
perception was for “Partnership Responsiveness.”  The largest difference, (.671), was observed 
for “Partnership Momentum.” “Partnership Momentum” had the greatest difference with the 
private sector and was significantly different from the nonprofit and public sectors. The next 
largest difference, (.231), was observed for “Partnership Capacity,” also between the private and 
nonprofit sectors. For the two components, “Partnership Legitimacy,” and “Partnership 
Responsiveness,” the greatest difference was between the public and private sectors. Although 
these latter means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning since the study is was 
conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a population.  
Overall, there was a greater difference in perception of collaboration, by collaboration 
components between mandated partners and non-mandated partners with regard to sector. The 
following were observed:  
 The nonprofit and public sectors had a stronger perception of collaboration for the non-
mandated partners, with the nonprofit sector having the strongest overall.  The private 
sector and the public sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for the mandated 
partners, with the private sector having the strongest overall.  
 For both mandated and non-mandated partners, there was a greater difference of the 
perception of collaboration between the private and nonprofit sectors, followed by the 
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next greatest difference between the private and public sectors, and then the public and 
nonprofit sectors.  
 The private sector had the strongest perception of collaboration for the mandated partners 
group, and a much lower perception for the non-mandated partners group. The public 
sector had a stronger perception of collaboration for the mandated partner group, but not 
much more. The nonprofit partner group had much stronger perception of collaboration 
then the non-mandated partner group.  
 The strongest and weakest perceptions of collaboration, overall, for the public and 
nonprofit sectors were on the mandated side.  
 The private sector had the strongest perception of collaboration for “Partnership 
Responsiveness” for both the mandated and non-mandated partner groups. The private 
sector had the weakest perception of collaboration for “Partnership Legitimacy” for both 
the mandated and non-mandated partners.  
 For the mandated partners, the public and nonprofit sectors ranked the four collaboration 
components in the same order. 
 For the non-mandated partners, the public and nonprofit sectors had stronger perceptions 
of collaboration for “Partnership Momentum,” and “Partnerships Capacity.” The private 
sector had the weakest perception of collaboration for “Partnership Momentum.” 
Additionally, mandated and non-mandated partners, individually, had similarities with regard 
to the four components of collaboration, but when the mandated and non-mandated partners were 
compared by sector, there were greater differences. When comparing the mandated and non-
mandated partners by sector, both the mandated and non-mandated groups, individually, had the 
greatest difference for “Partnership Momentum” and the least amount of difference for 
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“Partnership Legitimacy.” The greatest difference between the mandated and non-mandated 
partners, overall, was for “Partnership Legitimacy” and “Partnership Responsiveness.” This was 
followed by “Partnership Momentum,” and lastly, “Partnership Capacity”. When comparing 
mandated and non-mandated partners, the strongest and weakest perception of collaboration for 
each sector was not the same for any of the components. The biggest differences by sector 
between mandated and nonmandated partner groups were in the following order: 
 Nonprofit Sector– “Partnership Legitimacy, Momentum, Responsiveness, Capacity” 
 Public Sector– “Partnership Momentum, Legitimacy, Responsiveness, Capacity” 
 Private Sector– “Partnership Momentum, Legitimacy, Capacity, Responsiveness” 
Table 16 provides a summary. 
 
Table 16  
Comparison of Collaboration Components for Non-mandated Partners  
“Partnership Capacity” “Partnership Responsiveness” “Partnership Legitimacy” “Partnership Momentum” 
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = .140); 
 
Difference: .071  
 
Public Sector 
(M = .069); 
 
Difference: .160  
 
Private Sector 
(M = -.091) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .231 
(H8) 
 
Private Sector 
(M = .153); 
 
Difference: .127  
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = .026); 
 
Difference: .093 
 
Public Sector 
(M = -.067) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .220 
(H9) 
 
Public Sector 
(M = -.008); 
 
Difference: .038  
 
Nonprofit Sector 
 (M = -.046); 
 
Difference: .150  
 
Private Sector 
(M = -.197) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .189 
(H10) 
 
Nonprofit Sector 
(M = .314); 
 
Difference: .102  
 
Public Sector 
 (M = .212); 
 
Difference: .569  
 
Private Sector 
(M = -.357) 
 
 
Overall Difference: .671 
(H11) 
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The following two tables summarize the strongest and weakest perception of 
collaboration for each sector for mandated and non-mandated partners. 
 
Table 17 
Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration for Mandated Partners 
 
Sector 
 
 
Strongest Perception of Collaboration 
 
Weakest Perception of Collaboration 
 
Private 
 
“Partnership Momentum” 
 
“Partnership Capacity” 
 
Public 
 
“Partnership Legitimacy” 
 
“Partnership Responsiveness” 
 
Nonprofit 
 
“Partnership Legitimacy” 
 
“Partnership Momentum” 
 
 
 
Table 18 
Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration for Non-mandated Partners  
 
Sector 
 
 
Strongest Perception of Collaboration 
 
Weakest Perception of Collaboration 
 
Private 
 
“Partnership Responsiveness” 
 
“Partnership Momentum” 
 
Public 
 
“Partnership Momentum” 
 
“Partnership Responsiveness” 
 
Nonprofit 
 
“Partnership Momentum” 
 
“Partnership Legitimacy” 
 
 
Another way to look at the differences in perception of collaboration is to compare each 
sector from the mandated and the non-mandated groups. Table 19 details the results. 
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Table 19 
 Comparison of Strongest and Weakest Perception of Collaboration by Component 
 Mandated Partners 
      Strongest           Weakest 
     Non-mandated Partners 
    Strongest            Weakest 
 
“Partnership Capacity” 
 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
Private Sector 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
Private Sector 
 
“Partnership Responsiveness” 
 
Private Sector 
 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
Private Sector 
 
Public Sector 
 
“Partnership Legitimacy” 
 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
Private Sector 
 
Public Sector 
 
Private Sector 
 
“Partnership Momentum” 
 
Private Sector 
 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
 
Private Sector 
 
For the mandated group, the private and nonprofit sectors had the strongest or weakest 
collaboration for each component. The next largest difference after “Partnership Momentum” 
was observed for “Partnership Responsiveness,” and then “Partnership Capacity,” followed by 
“Partnership Legitimacy.” 
For the non-mandated group, after “Partnership Momentum,” the next largest difference 
was observed for “Partnership Capacity,” also between the private and nonprofit sectors. An 
interesting result was that for the mandated partners, the public and nonprofit sectors ranked the 
four collaboration components in the same order.  
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4.5 - Significance of Trust 
 The variable “Trust” was used to determine if there was a difference in the perception of 
trust between mandated and non-mandated partners. The significance of trust was tested by 
determining the correlation of “Trust” to the four collaboration components produced from the 
principle components analysis: (1) “Partnership Capacity,” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness,” (3) 
“Partnership Legitimacy,” and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” 
 
4.5.1 - Trust of Mandated and Non-Mandated Partners 
In order to know the significance of trust, an independent t-test was conducted to 
determine which group (mandated or non-mandated partners) had a stronger perception of trust. 
The two questions on the survey representing “Mutual respect, understanding, and trust” 
represented the variable “Trust.” The assumption of homogeneity of variance was assessed by 
the Levene test, F = .276, p = .601; this indicated no significant violation of the equal variance 
assumption; therefore, the equal variances assumed version of the t test was used. The means did 
not differ significantly, t (122) = -1.066, p = .289, two-tailed. However, the non-mandated 
partners mean (M = 8.143, SD = 1.429) was 0.1 higher than the mandated partners mean (M = 
7.801, SD = 1.415). Although the means did not differ significantly, they still have meaning 
since the study was conducted with a finite population instead of from a sample pulled from a 
population. There was a stronger perception of trust for the non-mandated partners. Table 20 
details the results.  
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Table 20 
Independent t-test for Trust with Mandated/Non-mandated Partners 
 
 N Mean Std. Deviation df t Sig. 
 
Mandated Partners 
 
26 
 
7.801 
 
1.415 
 
122 
 
-1.066 
 
.289 
 
Non-mandated 
Partners 
 
 
98 
 
8.143 
 
1.429 
 
122 
 
-1.066 
 
.289 
 
 
4.5.2 - Correlation of Trust and Collaboration  
The variable “Trust” was tested for correlation to the four collaboration components 
produced from the principle components analysis: (1) “Partnership Capacity,” (2) “Partnership 
Responsiveness,” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy,” and (4) “Partnership Momentum.” In order to 
analyze “Trust” with the overall “Perception of Collaboration,” a correlation analysis was run to 
produce a correlation coefficients matrix for the variable “Trust,” the four components (named 
above) and the “Perception of Collaboration.” “Trust” was correlated the highest to the overall 
“Perception of Collaboration” and then to Component 1, “Partnership Capacity.” The lowest 
correlations to the four components was for “Partnership Legitimacy,” and “Partnership 
Momentum.” The correlation matrix is presented in Table 21.  
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Table 21 
Correlation Matrix for Trust, Collaboration Components and the Perception of Collaboration 
                                                                                                Correlation to Trust 
 
Component 1: “Partnership Capacity” 
 
 
.644** 
Component 2: “Partnership Responsiveness” 
 
.414** 
Component 3: “Partnership Legitimacy” 
 
.224* 
Component 4: “Partnership Momentum” 
 
.202* 
Perception of Collaboration (PC) 
 
.744** 
**denotes statistical significance p < .01; *denotes statistical significance p < .05 
 
4.6 - Summary of Hypotheses Testing and Results 
 After hypotheses testing, there was support for 13 hypotheses and no support for two 
hypotheses. Tables 19 -21 show a summary of the hypotheses testing and whether there was 
support or not. Of the tests, only hypotheses 6 and 15 had statistically significant results.  While 
the differences between the means of the other hypotheses are not statistically significant, they 
are nevertheless salient because they are differences between population means (as opposed to 
sample means).  
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Table 22 
Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
 
Hypotheses  
 
Results 
*Denotes 
Significant 
Result 
H1A In the case of cross-sector partnerships, non-mandated partners do 
have a stronger perception of collaboration than mandated partners. 
 
Mandated (M = .095); Non-mandated (M = -.007) 
 
No Support  
 
The following two hypotheses relate to collaboration from the private, public and nonprofit sectors for 
mandated partners (H2) and non-mandated partners (H3). 
 
H2A The perception of collaboration is different for mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Private (M = .940); Public (M = .019); Nonprofit (M = -.112) 
 
Support  
H3A The perception of collaboration is different for non-mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
 
Nonprofit (M = .434); Public (M = .206); Private (M = -.493) 
 
Support  
 
The following four hypotheses (H4, H5, H6, H7) relate to the collaboration components derived from 
principal components analysis and the differences in them between mandated and non-mandated 
partners. 
 
H4A Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership 
Capacity” than mandated partners. 
 
Non-mandated (M = .025); Mandated (M = -.033)  
 
Support  
H5A Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership 
Responsiveness” than mandated partners. 
 
Non-mandated (M = .047); Mandated (M = -.187) 
 
Support  
H6 A Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership 
Legitimacy” than mandated partners.  
 
Mandated (M = .374); Non-mandated (M = -.094) 
 
No Support * 
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H7A Non-mandated partners have a stronger perception of “Partnership 
Momentum” than mandated partners. 
  
Non-mandated (M =.014); Mandated (M = -.059) 
 
Support  
 
The following four hypotheses (H8, H9, H10, H11) relate to the collaboration components derived from 
principal components analysis and for the differences in them between mandated partners from the 
private, public and nonprofit sectors only. 
 
H8A The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for mandated 
partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
Nonprofit (M = .078); Public (M = .014); Private (M = -.523)  
 
Support  
H9A The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for 
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors.  
 
Private (M = .333); Public (M = -.165); Nonprofit (M = -.509) 
 
Support  
H10A  The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for 
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
 
Nonprofit (M = .707); Public (M = .280); Private (M = .240)  
 
Support  
H11A The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for 
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
Private (M = .889); Public (M = -.110); Nonprofit (M = -.388) 
 
Support  
 
The following four hypotheses (H12, H13, H14, H15) relate to the collaboration components derived 
from principal components analysis and for the differences in them between non-mandated partners 
from the private, public and nonprofit sectors only. 
 
H12A The perception of “Partnership Capacity” is different for non-
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
Nonprofit (M = .140); Public (M = .069); Private (M = -.091)  
 
Support  
H13A The perception of “Partnership Responsiveness” is different for non-
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
Private (M = .153); Nonprofit (M = .026); Public (M = -.067) 
 
Support  
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H14A The perception of “Partnership Legitimacy” is different for non-
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
Public (M = -.008); Nonprofit (M = -.046); Private (M = -.197) 
 
Support  
H15A 
 
The perception of “Partnership Momentum” is different for non-
mandated partners from the private, public and nonprofit sectors. 
  
Nonprofit (M = .314); Public (M = .212); Private (M = -.357)  
 
Support * 
Note: The strongest perception of collaboration is in boldface and means are arranged in order 
from highest to lowest. 
 
 
The following table is a visual representation of the results represented as means and their 
corresponding hypotheses. 
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Table 23 
Summary of Overall Results 
Par. 
Status 
Capacity Responsiveness Legitimacy Momentum Par.  
Status and 
Sector 
Capacity Responsiveness Legitimacy Momentum 
 
Mandated 
Partners 
 (M = .095) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(H1) 
 
 
Non-
mandated 
Partners 
(M = -.007) 
 
 
Mandated 
(M = -.033) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(H4) 
 
Mandated 
(M =-.187) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(H5) 
 
Mandated 
(M =.374) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(H6)* 
 
Mandated 
(M =-.059) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(H7) 
 
 
Private 
Sector 
(M = .940); 
 
Public 
Sector 
(M = .019);  
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = -.112) 
 
(H2) 
 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = .078); 
 
Public 
Sector 
(M = .014); 
 
Private 
Sector 
(M = -.523) 
 
(H8) 
 
Private  
Sector 
(M = .333); 
 
Public  
Sector 
(M = -.165); 
 
Nonprofit  
Sector 
(M = -.509) 
 
(H9) 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = .707); 
 
Public  
Sector 
(M = .280); 
 
Private  
Sector 
(M = .240) 
 
(H10) 
 
Private 
Sector 
(M = .889); 
 
Public  
Sector 
(M = -.110); 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = -.388) 
 
(H11) 
 
Non-
mandated 
(M = .025) 
 
Non- 
mandated  
(M = .047); 
 
Non-
mandated 
(M =-.094) 
 
Non-
mandated  
(M =.014); 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = .434); 
 
Public 
Sector 
(M = .206); 
 
Private 
Sector 
(M = -.493) 
 
(H3) 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = .140); 
 
Public 
Sector 
(M = .069); 
 
Private 
Sector 
(M = -.091) 
 
(H12) 
 
Private  
Sector 
(M = .153); 
 
Nonprofit  
Sector  
(M = .026); 
 
Public  
Sector 
(M = -.067) 
 
(H13) 
 
Public  
Sector 
(M = -.008); 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = -.046) 
 
Private  
Sector 
(M = -.197); 
 
(H14) 
 
Nonprofit 
Sector 
(M = .314); 
 
Public  
Sector 
(M = .212); 
 
Private  
Sector  
(M = -.357) 
 
(H15)* 
 
 
Denotes Statistically Significant * 
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Chapter 5: Discussion and Recommendations     
 
5.1 - Introduction 
Cross-sector partnerships that combine the perspectives and needs of public, private, and 
nonprofit sectors have been used to address public policy challenges. These partnerships, whether 
mandated or volitional, are formed in response to issues that no individual partner or sector can 
address effectively on its own and each sector provides unique contributions to the partnership. 
Yet, lacking effective collaboration, cross-sector partnerships can failure. Some of these 
partnerships, particularly regional partnerships, are riddled with challenges to collaboration, such 
as competition fueled by scare and sometimes declining public resources, lack of goal congruity, 
and trust concerns. These challenges can fuel conflict because cross-sector partnerships tend to 
create and enforce silos because of the inherent differences in the partners. This is further 
complicated by the complexities that are presented when partners are mandated to be a part of a 
partnership.  
Research has shown that trust and reputation among partners play an important role in the 
performance of partnerships. Trust between partners is a measure of the strength, durability, and 
ultimately, the efficiency and effectiveness of these relationships.  Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) theory allows us to understand the transactions within these partnerships and provides a 
mechanism to rigorously address such factors as trust. However, it is not clear what happens to 
trust when partnerships are required by government policy. Trust reduces transaction costs and 
therefore, this study used a TCE approach as its theoretical framework. Although other studies 
have used a TCE framework, the application of TCE theory to mandated and non-mandated 
partners in cross-sector partnerships remains less well explored. Additionally, there is little 
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research about linkages between the private, public and nonprofit sectors when they partner 
together, particularly in partnerships that are not voluntary in nature.  
 This study sought to determine if collaboration was perceived differently for mandated 
partnerships that had volitional and non-volitional (mandated) partners and if these perceptions of 
collaboration were also affected by the partners’ sector identity. For instance, will collaboration 
and trust be more likely to be positively perceived when partners are mandated or when they are 
volitional? And how does this perceived collaboration affect transaction costs and ultimately, the 
success of these partnerships? To answer these questions, this study used a non-experimental, 
quantitative research design and was cross-sectional.      
 The Wilder Collaboration Factors Inventory, a collaboration survey, was sent to a defined 
population of the 15 Governor-certified workforce board members across Virginia, as mandated 
to exist by the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA). The survey contained 
questions related to 22 factors (variables) that influence the success of collaboration. The 
expectation was that non-mandated partners would have a stronger perception of collaboration 
than mandated partners. Additionally, it was hypothesized that partners from different sectors 
would perceive collaboration differently. 
   
5.2 - Summary and Discussion of Results 
The research questions in this study sought to determine whether collaboration was 
perceived differently for cross-sector partnerships that had volitional and non-volitional 
(mandated) partners and if perceptions of collaboration were different when collaboration was 
disaggregated into components. From the study results, both research questions were answered 
and overall, 13 of the 15 hypotheses were supported. The findings in this study are consistent 
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with the literature on the importance of trust and collaboration. The results confirmed that the 
perception of collaboration differs when partnerships have mandated partners.  Contrary to the 
literature, mandated partners had a slightly stronger perception of collaboration than non-
mandated ones, something that was traced to the sectoral origins of the partners. This was 
surprising based on expectations that trust would be stronger in the case of non-mandated 
partners.  This underscored the importance of analyzing partnerships by sector rather than just as 
an aggregate.   
Also, it was determined that the length of time served on the board, or the “Time” 
variable only explained a small portion (1.2%) of the “Perception of Collaboration.” This was a 
little surprising, considering that the literature supports that trust is normally built over time. The 
variable “Trust” explained 55.3% of the “Perception of Collaboration,” and this indicated that 
“Trust” explained more than “Time” in this study. 
Furthermore, in this study, other important conclusions were made about the complex 
nature of cross-sector partnerships, particularly with mandated and non-mandated partners and 
the differences in the perception of collaboration that result from them.   Further disaggregation 
was obtained by dissecting collaboration into four components.  All four components: (1) 
“Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy:” and (4) 
“Partnership Momentum” were perceived differently and for all components except “Partnership 
Legitimacy,” the non-mandated partners perceived collaboration more strongly. As non-
mandated partners were hypothesized to have a stronger perception of collaboration overall, this 
was expected based on the collaboration partnership literature. Nor was this surprising because  
trust was perceived to be stronger by the non-mandated partners earlier in the study.  This 
indicates the importance of analyzing components of collaboration within cross-sector 
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partnerships in order to better determine how transaction costs may be affected. Clearly a 
disaggregated and deeper analysis provided more insight than just observing collaboration as a 
whole. 
 
5.2.1 - Analysis of Perception of Collaboration by Sector 
For both mandated and non-mandated partners, there was a greater difference in 
perception of collaboration between the private and nonprofit sectors, followed by the next 
largest difference between the private and public sectors, and the lowest difference between the 
public and nonprofit sectors.  This result is important in understanding which sectors have 
similar and dissimilar perceptions of collaboration in the partnership.  Surprisingly, the private 
and nonprofit sectors showed the greatest difference in their perception of collaboration 
compared to the difference between the private and public sectors. The surprise emerges because 
typically the public and private sectors are seen as the most culturally dissimilar, particularly as 
more nonprofits are starting to generate revenue and are commonly associated with associations 
that support private sector causes. The public and nonprofit sectors had the most similar 
perception, something that can be attributed to the similarity between their mission-oriented 
goals and services, particularly as contrasted with the private sector.  
When it came to the nature of the partnership, the nonprofit and public sectors had a 
stronger perception of collaboration in the case of non-mandated partners while the private sector 
had a stronger perception of collaboration for mandated partners. The private sector had the 
strongest perception of collaboration amongst mandated partners. This may be because of the 
belief that the partnership will not be successful if the survey respondent (private sector) does not 
participate in the partnership.  In WIOA mandates, the law requires that 51% of the board must 
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be from the private sector, yet, the law does not state which members of the private sector must 
participate. Therefore, this leaves the private sector participation individually by organization to 
be voluntary. For this reason, there may be more transition of board members and overall 
representation from the same private sector companies as it is more common for companies in 
the private sector to start-up, close or relocate to other states.  
On the other hand, the public sector is not run by the market, has finite organizations for 
certain public services and typically has little choice whether they are mandated to be a part of 
WIOA partnerships. Because of this, specific public sector organizations may have more 
longevity in the partnership, yet, less flexibility for exiting the partnership. 
  
5.2.2 - Analysis of the Perception of Collaboration by Components   
While certain mandated partners may serve on a board longer, they may not necessarily 
have more trust in the partnership or its partners, whether mandated or not. It may be that 
mandated partnerships have displaced trust-based partnerships considering that “Trust” most 
highly correlated with collaboration components, “Partnership Capacity,” and “Partnership 
Responsiveness,” and those were the two components where there was the most agreement. The 
two components, “Partnership Legitimacy,” and “Partnership Momentum” where there was the 
least agreement, had the least correlation to “Trust.” These results suggest that higher trust does 
lead to a stronger perception of collaboration. 
It is interesting that “Trust” was least correlated to the components, “Partnership 
Legitimacy,” and “Partnership Momentum.” Legitimacy describes the past, or collaboration 
history/reputation and momentum describes the future, which would include partner’s future 
actions. Graddy & Ferris (2007) suggest that organizations will prefer partners with who they 
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have ties and social network connections. The private sector had the weakest perception of 
collaboration for “Partnership Legitimacy,” for both the mandated and non-mandated partners. 
This may be because the private sector is less like the public and nonprofit sectors and may have 
had less ties and social connections prior to joining a partnership that mandated a 51% 
participation from the private sector.  
 
5.2.2.1 - Partnership Legitimacy 
 “Partnership Legitimacy” was the only collaboration component where mandated 
partners had a stronger perception as compared to non-mandated ones.  The component 
“Partnership Legitimacy” consisted of two variables:  (1) Collaborative group seen as a 
legitimate leader in the community; and (2) History of collaboration or cooperation in the 
community. This result could be contributed to the fact that mandated partner organizations 
would be, by nature, less transient for their participation on the board as described earlier and 
may know the history of collaboration in the community better. Mandated partners may also 
perceive that the collaborative group is seen as a legitimate leader in the community because 
they are required to participate and therefore, would most likely not see themselves as 
illegitimate to the partnership. 
 
5.2.2.2 - Partnership Momentum 
The collaboration component that had the most difference among survey respondents was 
for “Partnership Momentum” for the non-mandated partners from the private, public and 
nonprofit sectors. “Partnership Momentum” was created through principal components analysis 
from the following collaboration variables: (1) Favorable political and social climate; (2) 
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Members see collaboration as being in their self-interest; and (3) Sufficient funds, staff, materials 
and time. For the mandated partners, the greatest difference was between the private and 
nonprofit sectors and for the non-mandated partners there was a statistically significant 
difference between the private sector and the public and nonprofit sectors. Of all the components, 
“Partnership Momentum” had the largest difference for both the mandated and non-mandated 
partner groups. This finding is significant in that the momentum of the partnership would have 
an effect on transaction costs, and the overall success of the partnership.  
 
5.3 - Implications of the Study 
 The results of this study affect research and scholarship and professional practices in the 
public policy and administration fields.  These professional practices are mainstream among 
professional organizations involved in cross-sector partnerships. The results of this study give 
insights into these domains and are grouped accordingly in the two sections below.  
 
5.3.1 - Implications for Research and Scholarship 
In summary, the results of this study revealed interesting outcomes in addition to the 
expectations of the existing body of literature. First, this study added to the literature by 
examining collaboration between mandated and non-mandated partners, including a focus on 
sectors that are often at odds with one another. Contrary to the literature, mandated partners had 
a slightly stronger perception of collaboration than non-mandated ones, something that was 
traced to the sectoral origins of the partners.  This underscored the importance of analyzing 
partnerships by sectors rather than as an aggregate and that, clearly, trust is a complex variable.   
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Second, this study contributed to the collaboration and trust literature by examining the 
connections between collaboration by dissecting collaboration into components in partnerships 
that are not voluntary. All four components: (1) “Partnership Capacity;” (2) “Partnership 
Responsiveness;” (3) “Partnership Legitimacy;” and (4) “Partnership Momentum” were 
perceived differently in cross-sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners and, 
except for, “Partnership Legitimacy,” (a variable representing the collaborative past) non-
mandated partners perceived collaboration more strongly.  
While mandated partners had slightly more collaboration overall, the study revealed areas 
where collaboration differed by sector and even by sector within different collaboration 
components. In this sense, the study supported the current literature and confirmed the role of 
trust and its importance as it relates to transaction costs. But it also showed how other 
collaboration components can play a significant role, helping to weed out potential tendencies to 
satisfy government regulations and motivations driven by monetary awards and the desire for a 
positive public image.  
Additionally, the study results have implications on a broader level for the governance of 
mandated partnerships and how effectively they are working. It is important to consider if the 
partnership model makes optimal use of transactions to achieve program benefits and reduce 
costs. There are policy implications for the appropriate amount of government intervention and 
regulation in regard to the equity of membership in mandated partnerships. Federal legislation 
has requirements for WDBs that dictate who must participate and, for example, 51% of  partner 
participation must be from the private sector. Because of these specific guidelines, there may be 
organizations that do not have equal access to join these workforce partnerships and may have a 
harder barrier to entry.  
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In summary, the results extend the literature by introducing two broad considerations: (a) 
sectoral origin or allegiance of partners and (b) whether partners were mandated to participate.  
As well, by dissecting collaboration into constituent parts, the study advances the literature by 
showing how capacity, responsiveness, legitimacy and momentum affect collaboration in 
partnerships 
 
5.3.2 – Implications for Public Policy and Administration 
This study contributes to knowledge in the field by serving as a guide to policy makers 
and practitioners on the importance of the perception of collaboration and its potential impact on 
transaction costs for partnerships that require partners to join without free will. Policy makers 
and practitioners can use this study to help evaluate overall cross-sector partnership collaboration 
and capacity. Cross-sector collaboration, now more than ever, will be critical to solving policy 
public problems, even crises. As our society advances, so does our reliance on technology. Trust 
becomes particularly important for this reason as transaction costs, such as monitoring 
partnership actions, may have to rely on more trust-based assessments. Using economic theory, 
such as TCE theory, and applying it to a partnership’s performance is typically missing in 
performance evaluation. Taking into account the importance of trust and governance structure 
will enhance the evaluation of partnership performance and provide insight to any necessary 
partnership restructuring. Public policy practitioners can evaluate collaboration strategies beyond 
just a cost-benefit analysis to incorporate transition costs to increase the success of cross-sector 
partnerships.  
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5.4 - Recommendations for Future Research 
Additional research could be done with a mixed-method approach, including both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection to gain a better understanding of the extent of 
collaboration differences by sector. A mixed-method methodology would further explain why 
some sectors reported such differences for the mandated partner group versus the non-mandated 
partner group. This approach could shed light, for instance, on reasons why survey respondents 
may have answered survey questions in a certain way and identify where there was extreme 
agreement or disagreement so that the perception of collaboration could be further explored. This 
study could be replicated in other states, which may have slightly different state requirements for 
mandated partners for WIOA partnerships and would include other regulatory and environmental 
constants. Additionally, another study could focus more specifically on the individual WDBs in 
Virginia by reporting more information by partnership level as opposed to just the state 
aggregate. Finally, a study with a random sample of the over 600 WIOA boards across the 
country would allow for more data and generalized conclusions on a larger scale. 
The data in this study was collected with an online survey format and the response rate 
was 27.7%. Research that attempts to collect data in person, for example, at a board meeting, 
could result in a higher response rate. This approach may encourage more survey responses and 
overcome the possibility that the survey respondents that elected to participate in the study may 
have been more involved in the partnership than other peers that did not elect to participate in the 
study. Finally, this study was cross sectional, yet it studied phenomena (collaboration, trust) that 
evolve and change over time; therefore, a longitudinal study is recommended for a future study.  
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5.5 - Conclusion 
This study has significant implications for the governance of mandated cross-sector 
partnerships that have both mandated and non-mandated partners. This particularly applies to 
WIOA partnerships that mandate the makeup of partners in regional workforce boards across the 
country. The findings of this study are consistent with the literature on the importance of trust 
and collaboration, yet, this study also introduces the nuances of the complex nature of cross-
sector partnerships with mandated and non-mandated partners and the differences in the 
perception of collaboration that result from them.  These differing perceptions of collaboration 
can affect transaction costs, and therefore, the success of the partnership.  
Overall, the results of the study confirm some aspects of the literature, particularly the 
salience of trust in reducing transaction costs and furthering collaboration. At the same time, the 
results extend the literature by introducing two broad considerations: (a) sectoral origin or 
allegiance of partners and (b) whether partners were mandated to participate.  As well, by 
dissecting collaboration into constituent parts, the study advances the literature by showing how 
capacity, responsiveness, legitimacy and momentum affect collaboration in partnerships.  In 
addition, this study contributes to knowledge in the field by serving as a guide to policy makers 
and practitioners on the importance of the perception of collaboration and its potential impact on 
transaction costs for partnerships that require partners to join without free will. Solving complex 
public policy demands, such as ensuring a highly skilled workforce, will require collaboration 
from all sectors and in the most effective way possible. Policy makers and practitioners can use 
this study to evaluate collaboration strategies that increase the success of cross-sector 
partnerships.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
  
 
VIRGINIA BOARD OF WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
I. Purpose 
This policy provides guidance for the establishment and membership of Local Workforce 
Development Boards under the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA).  
 
II. Summary  
Each local workforce development area designated in the Commonwealth shall establish 
and maintain a Local Workforce Development Board (Local Board). Chief Local Elected 
Officials (CLEOs) appoint the Local Board, which is certified every two years by the 
Governor.  
The Local Board is part of a statewide workforce system which is business-driven, 
customer- centric, streamlined, and outcome-oriented. The Local Board shall carry out 
strategies and policies that support both the economic development mission(s) for the 
local area and the Virginia Board of Workforce Development’s (VBWD) goals. The 
Local Board sets policy for the local area, in compliance with broader state policy, and is 
the regional strategic convener, or acts in partnership with a designated regional 
convener, in addressing workforce development issues, including but not limited to 
WIOA activities.  
The Local Board shall be led by committed business leaders who can ensure that the local 
workforce system is responsive to current and projected labor market demand, shall 
contain a broad range of partners needed to develop a comprehensive vision for the local 
workforce system, and shall focus on strategic decisions, not operational management.  
The Local Board has responsibility for making the following critical decisions:  
Policy Area: Local and Regional Governance  
Title of Policy: Establishment and Membership of Local Workforce 
Development Boards  Number: 200-02 (2016)  
Effective Date: July 1, 2016  Review by Date: July 1, 
2018  
Approved Date: June 23, 2016  
Revision Date: July 1, 2016 (Rescinds and replaces current Policy 15-01)  
Approved by:  
Mark Herzog  
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 How best to organize the regional workforce system to most effectively serve the 
needs of current and emerging private sector employers and job seekers;  
 How best to provide comprehensive services to regional private sector employers.  
 How best to deploy available resources to achieve negotiated local performance 
accountability measures and build capacity for continuous improvement; and  
 How to expand the resource base and service capability through the development of 
strategic partnerships, an integrated service delivery system, and generation of 
additional public and private funding.  
III.  References  
 Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (Pub. L. 113-128)  
 Training and Employment Notice No. 05-14, Workforce Innovation and Opportunity 
Act Announcement and Initial Informational Resources  
 Training and Guidance Letter No. 19-14, Vision for the Workforce System and Initial 
Implementation of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act of 2014  
 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) Docket No. ETA-2015-0001, RIN: 1205- 
AB73: Subpart C  
III. Policy  
Chief local elected officials shall submit annually to the Virginia Board of Workforce 
Development updated Local Board membership information including contact 
information for the Local Board, the annual budget for the Local Board and one-stop 
operations, and other expenditures. The term “chief local elected official” means the chief 
elected executive officer of a unit of general local government in a local area or an 
elected official so designated by the chief local elected official.  
A complete list of mandatory and optional Local Workforce Development Board 
members can be found in Section 107(b) of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity 
Act. There is no limit to the number of members the Local Board may have, but it must 
include all mandatory members.  
Mandatory Members  
 At least 51% of the members shall be composed of local private sector representatives 
that represent a broad range of in-demand occupations available in the local labor 
market. This includes organizations representing businesses that provide employment 
opportunities that, at a minimum, include high-quality, work relevant training and 
development in in-demand industry sectors or occupations in the local area.  
 Not less than 20%, a minimum of two, of the members of the Local Board, shall be 
representatives of labor organizations, who have been nominated by local labor 
federations, and representatives from apprenticeship programs. Community-based 
organizations that have demonstrated experience and expertise in addressing the 
employment needs of individuals with barriers to employment, including veterans, 
persons with disabilities, and “out of school” youth may be included in addition to the 
aforementioned labor organization representatives.  
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 At least one representative from the Virginia Employment Commission who 
administers WIOA Title III activities for the local area who shall be designated by the 
Virginia Employment Commission.  
 At least one regional adult education program manager that directly administers 
WIOA Title II Adult Education and Family Literacy (AEFLA) activities locally. If 
there is more than one adult education program operating in the LWDB area and each 
regional program manager is not represented on the board, it is recommended that 
regional adult education program managers serve alternating terms.  
 At least one representative of a school division Career and Technical Education 
program which represents programs aligned with the region’s targeted industry 
sectors and demand occupations  
 At least one representative from a local community college providing training 
services who shall be designated by the community college. At least one 
representative from a regional or local economic and community development entity. 
 At least one representative from the Department of Aging and Rehabilitative Services 
and/or the Department for the Blind and Visually Impaired who administers WIOA 
Title IV activities for the local area who shall be designated by the two agencies 
administering vocational rehabilitative services under Title IV of the WIOA  
Optional Members  
 A representative from a regional planning entity.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering WIOA Title I Adult and 
Dislocated Workers Employment and Training activities.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering WIOA Title I Youth Workforce 
Investment activities.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering the Social Security Act Title IV 
(Part activities.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering employment and training 
activities carried out through the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services’ 
Community Services Block Grant.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering employment and training 
activities carried out through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s Community Development Block Grant.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering Title V of the Older Americans 
Act programs for engaging low-income senior citizens in community service, 
employment, and volunteer opportunities.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering Section 212 of the Second 
Chance Act offender reintegration activities.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering Supplemental Nutrient 
Assistance Program Employment and Training activities.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering Social Security Ticket to Work, 
Disability Employment Initiative, and other self-sufficiency programs.  
 A representative of eligible providers administering Small Business Association 
Employment and Training activities.  
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 A representative of an entity that administers programs serving the local area relating 
to transportation, housing, and public assistance.  
 A superintendent, or designated representative, of a local public school system (other 
than a representative from a local Career and Technical Education program).  
 A representative of higher education providing WIOA activities.  
 A representative of a philanthropic organization.  
 Any other individual or representative of an entity as the chief elected officials in the 
local area may determine to be appropriate.  
Chairperson  
The members of the Local Board shall elect a chairperson from among the private sector 
representatives. The chairperson shall serve as the Executive Committee Chair and shall 
identify the method for selecting the chairs for all standing committees and taskforces of 
the local Board.  
Membership Terms  
 Members of the Local Board must be individuals with optimum policy-making 
authority within the organizations, agencies, or entities they represent.  
 Members of the Local Board shall be appointed for staggered terms.  
 Private sector representatives shall be an appropriate mix of small, medium and large 
employers that reflect the local labor market, i.e., the business representation shall 
reflect the industry mix in the local labor market.  
 Individuals serving on the Local Board who subsequently retire or no longer hold the 
position that made them eligible board members may continue to serve on the local 
Board; however, if their membership category changes as result of their retirement or 
change in employment status, the local board must account for that change when 
evaluating overall membership composition.  
 Vacancies resulting from resignations or removal of mandatory members must be 
filled within 90 days.  
Conflict of Interest  
All members of the Local Board serve a public interest and trust role and have a clear 
obligation to conduct all affairs in a manner consistent with this concept. All decisions of 
the Local Board are to be based on promoting the best interest of the state and the public 
good.  
Accordingly:  
 All members of the Local Board are subject to the provisions of the State and Local 
Government Conflict of Interest Act.  
 The Local Board shall adopt in its bylaws a conflict of interest policy meeting the 
minimum standards set forth in the State and Local Government Conflict of Interest 
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Act. The conflict of interest standards shall apply to all board members (voting and 
non‐ voting).  
 A member of a Local Board shall neither cast a vote on, nor participate in, any 
decision‐ making capacity on the provision of services by such member (or by an 
organization that such member directly represents); nor on any matter that would 
provide any direct benefit to such member or the immediate family of such member. 
Immediate family means (1) a spouse and (2) any other person residing in the same 
household as the member, who is a dependent of the member or of whom the member 
is a dependent. Dependent means any person, whether or not related by blood or 
marriage, which receives from the member, or provides to the member, more than 
one‐half of his financial support.  
 Any Local Board member (or specific entity represented by that member) who 
participates in the development of contract specifications or standards is prohibited 
from receiving any direct financial benefit from any resulting contract.  
 Any Local Board member who participates in a Local Board decision relating to 
specific terms of a contract, the determination of specific standards for performance 
of a contract, the development of Invitations for Bid or Requests for Proposals or 
other such bid processes leading to a contract, or any similar decisions is prohibited 
from receiving any direct financial benefit from any resulting contract. In addition, no 
corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship, firm, enterprise, franchise, association, 
trust, foundation or other entity shall receive the contract if it would create a conflict 
of interest for the Board member who participated in this manner.  
 Each Local Board member shall file a statement of economic interest with the Local 
Board as a condition of assuming membership and then annually while serving as a 
Board member. The Chief Local Elected Officials shall determine the composition of 
the statement of economic interest.  
 Any Local Board member with a potential or actual conflict of interest shall disclose 
that fact to the Local Board as soon as the potential conflict is discovered and, to the 
extent possible, before the agenda for the meeting involving the matter at issue is 
prepared. If it is determined during a meeting that a conflict of interest exists, the 
member must verbally declare such conflict of interest, such declaration must be 
clearly noted in the minutes, and such member must excuse himself from the 
remainder of the discussion and voting on that item. Each Local Board member is 
responsible for determining whether any potential or actual conflict of interest exists 
or arises during his tenure on the Local Board.  
 If a contract or purchase is made by the Local Board involving its own member with a 
conflict of interest, the Local Board shall justify the terms and conditions of the 
contract or purchase and document that the contract or purchase was adequately bid 
or negotiated and that the terms of the contract or price of the purchase are fair and 
reasonable.  
 Local Board members who are also one-stop center operators shall not serve on any 
committees that deal with oversight of the one-stop system or allocation of resources 
that would potentially be allocated to that member’s program.  
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 All members of the Local Board are subject to all other provisions of the State and 
Local Government Conflict of Interest Act not outlined above.  
V.  Procedures  
Local Board Appointment Process  
Nominations and Selection  
The Chief Local Elected Officials shall contact the appropriate entities in the local area 
for nominations to appoint members and/or to fill vacancies on the Local Board from 
business, local educational entities, and labor representatives. Chief Local Elected 
Officials may also design a process for nominations of individuals and other types of 
representation the officials would like to include on the Local Board. Vacancies 
subsequent to the establishment of the Local Board must be filled in the same manner as 
the original appointments.  
Private sector representatives are to be selected from individuals nominated by local 
business organizations (ex. business trade associations, chamber of commerce, economic 
development agencies). Individual businesses may also nominate themselves or provide 
nominations of other businesses to the chief local elected officials. Private sector 
representatives can include owners of businesses, chief executives or operating officers of 
businesses, and other business executives with optimum policy making or hiring 
authority (ex. Vice Presidents of Human Resources).  
Non-mandatory educational entity representatives must be selected from among 
individuals nominated by regional or local educational agencies, institutions, or 
organizations representing such local educational entities including local school boards, 
entities providing vocational education, and postsecondary educational institutions. Labor 
representatives must be selected from among individuals nominated by local labor 
federations (or in a local area in which no employees are represented by such 
organizations, other representatives of employees, such as employee organizations and/or 
the state AFL‐CIO).  
For all other members, Chief Local Elected Officials should consult with the appropriate 
groups in the local area for possible individuals to serve including:  
 Representatives of community‐based organizations, including organizations 
representing individuals with disabilities and veterans where such organizations exist 
in the area. 
 Representatives of local economic development agencies, including private sector 
economic development entities.  
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Public Participation  
 
Chief Local Elected Officials must provide public notice of the intent to solicit 
nominations for Local Board membership, including the process to be used for 
nominations and selection.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
VIRGINIA COLLABORATION SURVEY 
 
This survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes to complete. Be sure to answer all questions. There 
are no right or wrong answers.  
Your identification is anonymous. Survey results will be kept confidential and will not be reported 
individually. Results of the survey will be reported aggregately for individual Workforce Development 
Boards and in total for all Workforce Development Boards in Virginia. Data from demographic questions 
about organization sector, time served on the board, and whether or not you are required to be on the 
board will only be reported collectively for all Workforce Development Boards in Virginia.  
After the demographic questions, please select the best answer for each survey item. The words 
"collaboration," "collaborative group," and "collaborative project" are referring to your Workforce 
Development Board and the work that is being done by that Workforce Development Board only. Please 
respond to each item as you view the overall Workforce Development Board partnership. If you are not a 
member of a Workforce Development Board in Virginia, please do not fill out the survey.  
Please ensure you hit 'submit' once you have completed the survey to record your answers. Thank you 
for participating in this survey.  
 
1. Please name the Workforce Development Board that you are serving on. 
_________________________ 
 
2. How long have you served on this Workforce Development Board?  
      _____ 0-12 months 
      _____ 13-24 months 
      _____ 25-48 months 
      _____ 49+ months 
 
3. Please indicate whether the organization that you represent on the Workforce Development Board is 
a private, public or a nonprofit sector organization.  
      _____ private sector organization  
      _____ public sector organization  
      _____ nonprofit sector organization  
 
4. Are you required to serve on this Workforce Development Board?  
      _____ Yes 
      _____ No 
      _____ I don’t know 
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Factor 
 
Statement 
Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree Neutral, No 
Opinion  
Agree  Strongly 
Agree 
History of collaboration 
or cooperation in the 
community 
5. Agencies in our community 
have a history of working 
together. 
6. Trying to solve problems 
through collaboration has 
been common in this 
community. It has been done 
a lot before. 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
Collaborative group 
seen as a legitimate 
leader in the community 
 
7. Leaders in this community 
who are not part of our 
collaborative group seem 
hopeful about what we can 
accomplish.  
8. Others (in this community) 
who are not a part of this 
collaboration would 
generally agree that the 
organizations involved in this 
collaborative project are the 
“right” organizations to make 
this work. 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
Favorable political and 
social climate 
 
9. The political and social 
climate seems to be “right” 
for starting a collaborative 
project like this one.  
10. The time is right for this 
collaborative project. 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
Mutual respect, 
understanding, and trust 
 
11. People involved in our 
collaboration trust one 
another.  
12. I have a lot of respect for the 
other people involved in this 
collaboration 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
Appropriate cross 
section of members 
13. The people involved in our 
collaboration represent a 
cross section of those who 
have a stake in what we are 
trying to accomplish.  
14. All the organizations that we 
need to be members of this 
collaborative group have 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
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become members of the 
group. 
Members see 
collaboration as being in 
their self- interest 
15. My organization will benefit 
from being involved in this 
collaboration. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Ability to compromise 16. People involved in our 
collaboration are willing to 
compromise on important 
aspects of our project. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Members share a stake 
in both process and 
outcome 
 
17. The organizations that 
belong to our collaborative 
group invest the right 
amount of time in our 
collaborative efforts.  
18. Everyone who is a member 
of our collaborative group 
wants this project to 
succeed. 
19. The level of commitment 
among the collaboration 
participants is high. 
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
Multiple layers of 
participation 
 
20. When the collaborative 
group makes major 
decisions, there is always 
enough time for members to 
take information back to their 
organizations to confer with 
colleagues about what the 
decision should be.  
21. Each of the people who 
participate in decisions in 
this collaborative group can 
speak for the entire 
organization they represent, 
not just a part. 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
Flexibility 22. There is a lot of flexibility 
when decisions are made; 
people are open to 
discussing different options.  
23. People in this collaborative 
group are open to different 
approaches to how we can 
do our work. They are willing 
to consider different ways of 
working. 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
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Development of clear 
roles and policy 
guidelines 
 
24. People in this collaborative 
group have a clear sense of 
their roles and 
responsibilities.  
25. There is a clear process for 
making decisions among the 
partners in this collaboration. 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
Adaptability to changing 
conditions 
 
26. This collaboration is able to 
adapt to changing 
conditions, such as fewer 
funds than expected, 
changing political climate, or 
change in leadership. 
27. This group has the ability to 
survive even if it had to 
make major changes in its 
plans or add some new 
members in order to reach 
its goals. 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
5 
Appropriate pace of 
development 
 
28. This collaborative group has 
been careful to take on the 
right amount of work at the 
right pace. 
29. This group is currently able 
to 
keep up with the work 
necessary to coordinate all 
the people, organizations, 
and activities related to this 
collaborative project. 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
Evaluation and 
continuous learning 
 
30. A system exists to monitor 
and report the activities 
and/or services of our 
collaboration.  
31. We measure and report the 
outcomes of our 
collaboration.  
32. Information about our 
activities, services, and 
outcomes is used by 
members of the collaborative 
group to improve our joint 
work. 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
Open and frequent 
communication 
 
33. People in this collaboration 
communicate openly with 
one another.  
34. I am informed as often as I 
should be about what is 
going on in the collaboration.  
1 
 
 
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
 
2 
 
3 
 
 
 
3 
 
4 
 
 
 
4 
 
5 
 
 
 
5 
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35. The people who lead this 
collaborative group 
communicate well with the 
members. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
Established informal 
relationships and 
communication links 
 
36. Communication among the 
people in this collaborative 
group happens both at 
formal meetings and in 
informal ways.  
37. I personally have informal 
conversations about the 
project with others who are 
involved in this collaborative 
group. 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
5 
Concrete, attainable 
goals and objectives 
 
38. I have a clear understanding 
of what our collaboration is 
trying to accomplish.  
39. People in our collaborative 
group know and understand 
our goals.  
40. People in our collaborative 
group have established 
reasonable goals. 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
3 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
4 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
5 
 
 
5 
Shared vision 
 
41. The people in this 
collaborative group are 
dedicated to the idea that we 
can make this project work.  
42. My ideas about what we 
want to accomplish with this 
collaboration seem to be the 
same as the ideas of others. 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
Unique purpose 
 
43. What we are trying to 
accomplish with our 
collaborative project would 
be difficult for any single 
organization to accomplish 
by itself.  
44. No other organization in the 
community is trying to do 
exactly what we are trying to 
do. 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Sufficient funds, staff, 
materials, and time 
 
45. Our collaborative group has 
adequate funds to do what it 
wants to accomplish.  
46. Our collaborative group has 
adequate “people power” to 
1 
 
 
 
1 
2 
 
 
 
2 
3 
 
 
 
3 
4 
 
 
 
4 
5 
 
 
 
5 
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do what it wants to 
accomplish. 
Skilled leadership 47. The people in leadership 
positions for this 
collaboration have good 
skills for working with other 
people and organizations. 
1 
 
 
2 3 4 5 
Engaged stakeholders  
 
48. Our collaborative group 
engages other stakeholders, 
outside the group, as much 
as we should. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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APPENDIX C 
 
IRB Approval Letter 
 
 
TO: Niraj Verma  
CC: 
Vanessa Rastberger 
Niraj Verma 
 
  
 
FROM: VCU IRB Panel A  
RE: 
Niraj Verma ; IRB HM20016721   What Happens When Cross-Sector 
Partnerships are Mandated? Analyzing Trust through a Transaction Cost 
Approach 
On 8/6/2019 the referenced research study qualified for exemption according to 45 
CFR 46 under exempt category/categories 
Category 2(i) Research that only includes interactions involving educational tests, 
survey or interview procedures, or observation of public behavior when the information 
obtained is recorded in a manner that the identity of the subjects cannot readily be 
ascertained 
 
 
The information found in the electronic version of this study’s smart form and uploaded 
documents now represents the currently approved study, documents, and HIPAA 
pathway (if applicable). You may access this information by clicking the Study Number 
above. 
If you have any questions, please contact the Office of Research Subjects Protection 
(ORSP) or the IRB reviewer(s) assigned to this study. 
The reviewer(s) assigned to your study will be listed in the History tab and on the study 
workspace. Click on their name to see their contact information. 
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Attachment – Conditions of Approval for Exempt Studies 
 
Conditions of Approval for Exempt Studies (version 1/21/2019) 
In order to comply with federal regulations and the terms of this approval, the 
investigator must (as applicable): 
1. Conduct the research as described in and required by the IRB-approved 
protocol/smartform. 
2. Confirm that all non-VCU sites that have been approved to rely on the 
VCU IRB for research requiring limited IRB review [45 CFR 46.104(d)(2)(iii), 
(d)(3)(i)(C), (d)(7), or (d)(8))] are aware of and agree to abide by the reliance 
relationship and the institutional responsibilities outlined in WPP XVII-6. 
3. Submit amendments to the VCU IRB for review and approval before the 
following types of changes are instituted at any site under the VCU IRB’s 
oversight (VCU sites and non-VCU sites that rely on the VCU IRB): 
o Change in Principal Investigator 
o Addition or removal of non-VCU sites whenever one or more of the 
following applies: 
 VCU is the lead site in a multicenter study, 
 A VCU investigator is overseeing study conduct and/or 
directly, conducting research at another site, and/or 
 De-identified or identifiable research data will be sent to a 
different site 
o Any change that poses new risks or increases the risks to 
participants including, but not limited to, the following types of 
changes: 
 Changes in the study’s measures or the research 
intervention, including 
 Changes in behavioral intervention procedures or 
the use of deception, 
 Changes related to sexual activity, abuse, past or 
present illicit drug use, illegal activities, other 
sensitive topics, or other factors that might place 
participants at risk of civil or criminal liability 
 Changes reasonably expected to provoke 
psychological distress or that could make 
participants vulnerable, or 
 Changes that relate to participants’ financial 
standing, employability, educational advancement, 
or reputation. 
 Changes in the source of secondary information or 
biospecimens 
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 Changes in the confidentiality or privacy protections used by 
the study, including 
 Changes in the storage location or method of 
storage of research materials 
 Changes in the identifiers being used to carry out 
secondary research (regardless of whether 
identifiers are retained in the research data). 
 Changes related to the sharing of individual-level 
research data 
 Changes in recruitment strategy 
 Changes in the planned compensation to participants 
o Changes that alter the category of exemption or that add 
additional exemption categories 
 Changes that add procedures or activities not covered by the 
exempt category(ies) under which the study was originally 
determined to be exempt 
 Changes in the planned participant population (e.g. addition 
of children, wards of the state, or prisoner participants, 
students, control groups, etc.) 
 Changes in the participant identifiers being used and/or 
collected 
 For studies currently approved under Pre-2018 Common 
Rule Exempt Category 4: Change in inclusion dates for 
retrospective record reviews if the new date is after the 
original approval date for the exempt study. (Example: The 
approval date for the study is 9/24/18 and the original 
inclusion dates were 01/01/08-06/30/18. This could be 
changed to 01/01/06 to 09/24/18 but not to end on 09/25/18 
or later.) 
 
Changes that do not meet these criteria do not have to be 
submitted to the IRB. If there is a question about whether a 
change must be sent to the IRB please call the ORSP for 
clarification. 
  
4. Provide non-English speaking participants with a written translation of the 
approved consent information in language understandable to the research 
participant. The IRB must approve the translated version prior to use. 
5. Monitor all problems (anticipated and unanticipated) associated with risk to 
research participants or others. 
6. Report Unanticipated Problems (UPs), following the VCU IRB requirements 
and timelines detailed in WPP VII-6 
7. Respond promptly to all inquiries by the VCU IRB and Office of Research 
Subjects Protection concerning the conduct of the research. 
The VCU IRB operates under the regulatory authorities as described within: 
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 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Title 45 CFR 46, Subparts A, B, 
C, and D and related guidance documents. 
 U.S. Food and Drug Administration Chapter I of Title 21 CFR 50 and 56 (for FDA 
regulated research only) and related guidance documents. 
 Commonwealth of Virginia Code of Virginia 32.1 Chapter 5.1 Human Research 
(for all research). 
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APPENDIX D 
 
 
 
To: [Email] 
 
Subject: Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Workforce Partnerships in Virginia 
 
 
Dear [Name], 
I am conducting research on collaboration and transaction costs in workforce cross-sector 
partnerships and have selected to survey the Workforce Development Boards (WDB) in 
Virginia. This research is for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Public 
Policy and Administration at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). The overall scope of 
this study is to examine collaboration and transaction costs in cross-sector partnerships. It has 
been determined that, for example, as trust increases, transaction costs decrease, leading to better 
collaboration and partnership performance. 
I am requesting that you send a survey to your WDB members. You will find the survey attached 
for your review only; the actual survey will be administered online. Your participation is 
completely voluntary, and your response to this email will confirm your consent to distribute this 
survey. You should not fill out the survey. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes to 
complete and the name of the survey respondent will not be collected. Results of the study will 
be used to better understand cross-sector partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs of 
partnerships. 
This study has been reviewed by the VCU Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that 
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Please respond back to me 
via email affirming your consent to participate in the study. After doing so, I will send you an 
email with a link to the online survey and specific instructions to send to your WDB members 
only. The survey is intended for WDB members only, not Local Elected Officials (LEOs) that 
are not appointed to the board or alternate, non-voting members of the board. 
Please contact me directly if you have any questions about this study.  
Thank you, 
Vanessa H. Rastberger 
(804) 402-4909 
rastbergervh@vcu.edu 
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APPENDIX E 
 
 
Email: [Name] 
 
Subject: Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Workforce Partnerships in Virginia 
Dear [Name], 
Please send the information below to your Workforce Development Board (WDB) members as 
you previously agreed. You do not need to send this information to anyone outside of the board, 
such as Local Elected Officials, unless they are on the board and a voting member of the board. 
Thank you for your participation. I will reach back out to you in one week if I have not received 
at least a 30% survey response rate. Please let me know when you have sent the survey so I can 
track the timeframe that I can allow the survey to be open, which is three weeks from the initial 
send. Thank you. 
Vanessa H. Rastberger 
(804) 402-4909 
rastbergervh@vcu.edu 
 ____________________________________________________________________________ 
Email Subject Line: Virginia Collaboration Survey and Study on Transaction Costs in Workforce 
Partnerships  
Dear [Name], 
Vanessa H. Rastberger is conducting research on collaboration and transaction costs in 
workforce cross-sector partnerships and has selected to survey the Workforce Development 
Boards (WDB) in Virginia. This study is for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Doctorate in Public Policy and Administration at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). 
The overall scope of this study is to examine collaboration and transaction costs in cross-sector 
partnerships. It has been determined that, for example, as trust increases, transaction costs 
decrease, leading to better collaboration and partnership performance. 
Please click on this https://redcap.vcu.edu/surveys/?s=C4JF9WMFPLto complete the survey by 
September 12th, if possible. Please note the survey will close after three weeks. This survey can 
be taken on a mobile device or iPad as long as you have an internet connection. Your 
participation is completely voluntary, and by filling out the survey, you are consenting to 
participate in the study. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes to complete. In the 
interest of anonymity, you will not be asked your name, however, a few demographic questions 
will be asked. This project has been reviewed by the Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU) 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that research projects involving human subjects 
follow federal regulations. Results of the study will be used to better understand cross-sector 
partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs of workforce partnerships. 
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Please contact Ms. Rastberger directly if you have any questions about this study. She can be 
reached at (804) 402-4909 and rastbergervh@vcu.edu. 
Thank you, 
WDB Executive Director 
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APPENDIX F 
 
 
Email: [Name] 
 
Subject: Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Workforce Partnerships in Virginia 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
Thank you, [Name]. Per my research protocol, I am reaching out to you one week after the 
survey was sent to let you know the response rate. I have received X% (X out of X) of responses 
from your WDB members. If you are able, please resend the information below to the WDB 
members. If there is anything that I can do to assist in getting a higher response rate, please let 
me know. Thank you for your participation. I will reach back out to you one final time one week 
from when you send the reminder to let you know how many responses I have gotten. I am able 
to share this data with your WDB after the survey is over. Thank you. 
  
Vanessa H. Rastberger 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
Subject: WDB Study on Collaboration and Transaction Costs in Virginia 
  
Dear [Name], 
  
This is a reminder and follow up email. Vanessa H. Rastberger is conducting research on 
collaboration and transaction costs in workforce cross-sector partnerships and has selected to 
survey the Workforce Development Boards (WDB) in Virginia. This study is for partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the Doctorate in Public Policy and Administration at Virginia 
Commonwealth University (VCU). The overall scope of this study is to examine collaboration 
and transaction costs in cross-sector partnerships. It has been determined that, for example, as 
trust increases, transaction costs decrease, leading to better collaboration and partnership 
performance. 
  
Please click on https://redcap.vcu.edu/surveys/?s=C4JF9WMFPL to complete the survey in the 
next week, if possible. This can be done on a mobile device or iPad as long as you have an 
internet connection. Your participation is completely voluntary, and by filling out the survey, 
you are consenting to participate in the study. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes 
to complete. In the interest of anonymity, you will not be asked your name, however, a few 
demographic questions will be asked. This project has been reviewed by the Virginia 
Commonwealth University (VCU) Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that 
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Results of the study will 
be used to better understand cross-sector partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs for our 
WDB and Virginia as a whole. 
  
Please contact Ms. Rastberger directly if you have any questions about this study. She can be 
reached at (804) 402-4909 and rastbergervh@vcu.edu 
 
   
 
 
 
 
132 
Thank you, 
WDB Executive Director 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 
Email: [Name] 
 
Subject: Last Attempt for Virginia Survey of Workforce Board Members 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
This is my last attempt to collect survey responses from your board. I am following up with you 
because I have only received a X% response rate (X out of X). However, there were X additional 
responses after you sent the 1st reminder taking your response rate from X% to X%. Please 
resend the information below to your WDB members. If there is anything that I can do to assist 
in getting a higher response rate, please let me know. Thank you for your time and participation. 
I will be back in touch with a final response rate and after I have done the data analysis. Lastly, 
can you confirm that you sent the survey to X members or if there is a different number of board 
members other than what your website reported.  
Vanessa H. Rastberger 
(804) 402-4909 
rastbergervh@vcu.edu 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
Subject: Last Chance - Virginia Survey with Workforce Board Members on Collaboration and 
Transaction Costs 
 
Dear [Name], 
 
Vanessa H. Rastberger is conducting research on collaboration and transaction costs in 
workforce cross-sector partnerships and has selected to survey the Workforce Development 
Boards (WDB) in Virginia. This study is for partial fulfillment of the requirements for the 
Doctorate in Public Policy and Administration at Virginia Commonwealth University (VCU). 
The overall scope of this study is to examine collaboration and transaction costs in cross-sector 
partnerships. It has been determined that, for example, as trust increases, transaction costs 
decrease, leading to better collaboration and partnership performance. 
 
Please click here https://redcap.vcu.edu/surveys/?s=C4JF9WMFPL to complete this survey no 
later than October 1st.Your participation is completely voluntary, and by filling out the survey, 
you are consenting to participate in the study. The survey will take approximately 15-25 minutes 
to complete. In the interest of anonymity, you will not be asked your name, however, a few 
demographic questions will be asked. This project has been reviewed by the Virginia 
Commonwealth University (VCU) Institutional Review Board (IRB), which ensures that 
research projects involving human subjects follow federal regulations. Results of the study will 
be used to better understand cross-sector partnerships, collaboration and transaction costs of 
partnerships. 
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Please contact Ms. Rastberger directly if you have any questions about this study. She can be 
reached at (804) 402-4909 and rastbergervh@vcu.edu 
 
Thank you, 
WDB Executive Director 
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APPENDIX H 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained 
 
 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 10.861 49.367 49.367 10.861 49.367 49.367 
2 1.292 5.872 55.239 1.292 5.872 55.239 
3 1.167 5.306 60.546 1.167 5.306 60.546 
4 1.082 4.920 65.466 1.082 4.920 65.466 
Extraction Method: Principal Components Analysis 
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APPENDIX I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
137 
APPENDIX J 
 
 
 
Unrotated Factor Loadings Matrix 
Variables Factors 
1 2 3 4 
Shared Vision .837    
Concrete, attainable objectives .832    
Mutual respect, understanding, and trust .821    
Open and frequent communication .819    
Appropriate pace of development .819    
Flexibility .784    
Development of clear roles and policy 
guidelines .764    
Evaluation and continuous learning .760    
Skilled Leadership .758 -.403   
Appropriate cross-section of members .748    
Members share a stake in both process 
and outcomes .745    
Adaptability .743    
Engaged stakeholders .695    
Ability to compromise .690    
Unique purpose .659    
Established informal relationships and 
communication links .630    
Favorable political and social climate .570 .495   
Members see collaboration as in their 
self-interest .508   .482 
Sufficient funds, staff, materials, and 
time  .461   .458 
Collaborative group seen as a legitimate 
leader in the community .533 .558   
History of collaboration or cooperation in 
the community .460 .556   
Multiple layers of participation .593  .648  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
a. 4 factors extracted 
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APPENDIX K 
 
Loadings for Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
 Component 1:  
“Partnership 
Capacity” 
Component 2:     
“Partnership 
Responsiveness” 
Component 3: 
“Partnership 
Legitimacy” 
Component 4:                
“Partnership 
Momentum” 
Communality 
Skilled leadership .816    .753 
Adaptability to changing 
conditions 
.780    .692 
Concrete, attainable goals and 
objectives 
.735  .405  .803 
Evaluation and continuous 
learning 
.726  .416  .726 
Shared Vision .721    .745 
Open and frequent 
communication 
.687 .489   .749 
Mutual respect, understanding, 
and trust 
.644    .682 
Established informal 
relationships and communication 
links 
.637    .528 
Appropriate pace of development .605 .418   .673 
Engaged stakeholders .569 .413   .528 
Unique purpose .539    .463 
Development of clear roles and 
policy guidelines 
.498 .449 .420  .638 
Members share a stake in both 
process and outcome 
.476    .607 
Multiple layers of participation  .847   .784 
Flexibility .528 .582   .682 
Appropriate cross section of 
members 
.440 .563   .613 
Ability to compromise .430 .497   .517 
Collaborative group seen as a 
legitimate leader in the 
community 
  .807  .737 
History of collaboration or 
cooperation in the community 
  .749  .627 
Favorable political and social 
climate 
   .713 .713 
Members see collaboration as 
being in their self-interest 
   .709 .606 
Sufficient funds, staff, materials, 
and time 
   .524 .536 
 
Sum of squared loadings 6.37 2.41 1.73 1.29  
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% explained variance 49.37% 5.87% 5.31% 4.92% 
Note: Factor loadings >.4 are in boldface (N = 126) 
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VITA 
 
 
Vanessa Hubbard Rastberger was born in Virginia. She received her Bachelor of Arts in 
International Relations from Randolph-Macon College in Ashland, Virginia. She received a 
Master of Public Administration from Virginia Commonwealth University in Richmond, 
Virginia. Her professional career has focused on workforce and education public policy while 
working in the private, public and nonprofit sectors at the local, state and national level.  
